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### 1

#### Will pass – top Democrats.

Reuters 2-3. ["Reid predicts Congress will pass immigration legislation" -- news.yahoo.com/reid-predicts-u-congress-pass-immigration-legislation-172812947.html]

The top Senate Democrat on Sunday predicted that Congress will pass and send to President Barack Obama legislation overhauling the U.S. immigration system, saying "things are looking really good."¶ Obama last week expressed hope Congress can get a deal done on immigration, possibly in the first half of the year.¶ The president is proposing to give the roughly 11 million U.S. illegal immigrants - most of whom are Hispanics - a pathway to citizenship, a step that many Republicans have long fought.¶ Obama's fellow Democrats control the Senate, but Republicans control the House of Representatives.¶ Appearing on the ABC program "This Week," Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid was asked whether immigration legislation can win House passage.¶ "Well, it's certainly going to pass the Senate. And it would be a bad day for our country and a bad day for the Republican Party if they continue standing in the way of this. So the answer is yes," Reid said.¶ Obama choose Reid's home state of Nevada, with a sizable Hispanic population, as the site for a major speech last Tuesday pushing Congress to pass an immigration bill.¶ Hispanic voters were crucial in helping Obama beat Republican nominee Mitt Romney - who advocated "self-deportation" of illegal immigrants - in Nevada in November.¶ "It has to get done," Reid said of immigration legislation.¶ "It's really easy to write principles. To write legislation is much harder. And once we write the legislation, then you have to get it passed. But I think things are looking really good," Reid added.¶ After years on the back burner, immigration reform has suddenly looked possible as Republicans, chastened by the fact that more than 70 percent of Hispanic voters backed Obama in the November election, appear more willing to accept an overhaul.

#### SMRs unpopular – opposition due to fear of waste, contamination and terror targets.

Smith ’10 (Rebecca, Contributor, “Small Reactors Generate Big Hopes”, The Wall Street Journal, 2-18-10,

<http://www.generatorsystems.com/pdf/Small%20Reactors%20Generate%20Big%20Hopes%20WSJ%2002-18-2010.pdf>, accessed 8-1-12)

"We see significant benefits from the new, modular technology," said Donald Moul, vice president of nuclear support for First Energy, an Ohio-based utility company. He said First Energy, which operates four reactors at three sites in Ohio and Pennsylvania, has made no decision to build any new reactor and noted there's "a lot of heavy lifting to do to get this reactor certified" by the NRC for U.S. use. Indeed, the smaller reactors still could incite major opposition. They face the same unresolved issues of where to put the waste and public fear of contamination, in the event of an accident. They could also raise alarms about creating possible terrorism targets in populated areas. Still, the sudden interest in small reactors illustrates a growing unease with the route that nuclear power has taken for half a century. What many regard as the first commercial reactor built in the U.S., in 1957 at Shippingport, Pa., was only about 60 megawatts in size. By the time construction petered out three decades later, reactors had grown progressively bigger, ending up at about 1,000 megawatts of capacity.

#### PC key to get immigration compromise,

Hollander 1-21. [Catherine, reporter, "4 Ways Obama Could Boost Economy in His 2nd Term" National Journal -- www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/4-ways-obama-could-boost-economy-in-his-2nd-term-20130121]

3. Pass immigration reform. Obama has made clear that immigration reform is a top priority for his second term. A bipartisan group of senators has been working to draft a bill to overhaul the nation's immigration laws. The issue is teed up for the 113th Congress. On Sunday, top White House adviser David Plouffe said there was “no reason” immigration reform shouldn’t move through Congress this year. Still, passing legislation will be no easy feat. Republicans want to take up immigration initiatives piecemeal, while Obama is calling for comprehensive legislation.¶ If Congress can reach agreement on immigration policy, it could help the economy. “Comprehensive immigration reform that legalizes currently unauthorized immigrants and creates flexible legal limits on future immigration in the context of full labor rights would help American workers and the U.S. economy,” Raúl Hinojosa-Ojeda of the University of California-Los Angeles, wrote in the Cato Journal last winter. More recently, Kevin Hassett of the conservative American Enterprise Institute argued that a “vast expansion of legal immigration could feed the next economic boom.”

#### Immigration reform is critical to US-Latin American relations

Barshefsky and Hill April 12 (Charlene and James T., Chairs Council on Foreign Relations, US-Latin America Relations: A New Direction For a New Reality”)

Some enduring problems stand squarely in the way of partnership and effective cooperation . The inability of Washington to reform its broken immigration system is a constant source of friction between the United States and nearly every other country in the Americas . Yet US officials rarely refer to immigration as a foreign policy issue . Domestic policy debates on this issue disregard the United States’ hemispheric agenda as well as the interests of other nations.

#### Latin American relations solves Amazon deforestation

**Zedillo et al ‘8** (Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission The Brookings Institution November 2008 Ernesto Zedillo Commission co-chair; Former President of Mexico Thomas R. Pickering Commission co-chair; Former U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Memb e r s o f the Par t n e r s h i p for t h e Ame r i cas Commi ssi o n Mauricio Cárdenas Director of the Commission; Senior Fellow and Director, Latin America Initiative, Brookings Leonardo Martinez-Diaz Deputy Director of the Commission; Political Economy Fellow, Global Economy and Development, Brookings

The link between carbon-intensive activities and changes in the world’s climate is now well established, and the consequences will be felt across the hemisphere. According to figure 2, if current human activity remains unchanged, the hemisphere will likely suffer from a variety of ecological shocks, including declines in agricultural yields, water shortages, the loss of animal and plant species, and more frequent and destructive storms in the Caribbean Basin. These extreme weather events could bring devastation to Central America, the Caribbean, and the southeastern United States, imposing a heavy human and material toll. As we know from recent storms, the costs of replacing homes, businesses, and infrastructure—along with the higher costs of energy if refineries and offshore rigs are damaged—will be vast. Hemispheric Solutions Addressing the challenge of energy security will require making energy consumption more efficient and developing new energy sources, whereas addressing the challenge of climate change will require finding ways to control carbon emissions, helping the world shift away from carbon-intensive energy generation, and adapting to some aspects of changing ecosystems. Potential solutions to these problems exist in the Americas, but mobilizing them will require a sustained hemispheric partnership. Latin America has enormous potential to help meet the world’s growing thirst for energy, both in terms of hydrocarbons and alternative fuels. Latin America has about 10 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves. Venezuela accounts for most of these, though Brazil’s oil reserves could increase from 12 to 70 billon barrels if recent discoveries can be developed. Bolivia is an important producer of natural gas, Mexico has great potential in solar energy generation, and several countries in the region could potentially produce much more hydroelectric power. Brazil is a world leader in sugarcane-based ethanol production, and the United States is a leader in corn-based ethanol (figure 3). Solar and wind power, particularly in Central America and the Caribbean, remain underdeveloped. To expand the hemisphere’s energy capacity, massive infrastructure investments will be required. Major investments in oil production 13 (especially deep offshore), refining, and distribution will be needed to achieve the region’s potential. Developing the Tupi project in Brazil alone will cost $70–240 billion. Liquefied natural gas will become an important source of energy, but not before major investments are made in infrastructure to support liquefaction, regasification, transport, and security. U.S. and Canadian electricity networks, which are already highly integrated, can be further integrated with Mexico’s. Mexico also plans to connect its grid to those of Guatemala and Belize, eventually creating an integrated power market in Central America. Power integration in South America will demand even larger investments in generation, transmission, and distribution. Finally, reliance on nuclear power may grow because it is carbon free and does not require fossil fuel imports. However, efforts to expand energy capacity and integrate hemispheric energy markets face a variety of obstacles. Energy nationalism has led to disruptive disputes over pricing and ownership. Tensions and mistrust in South America have hindered regional cooperation and investment, particularly on natural gas. The security of the energy infrastructure, especially pipelines, remains a concern in Mexico and parts of South America. Gas, oil, and electricity subsidies distort patterns of production and consumption, and they are triggering protectionist behavior elsewhere. Technology on renewables remains underdeveloped, and research in this area can be better centralized and disseminated. Overcoming these obstacles will require high levels of cooperation among hemispheric partners. In addition to developing carbon-neutral sources of energy, the Western Hemisphere has other roles to play in combating climate change. The LAC region currently accounts for about 5 percent of annual global carbon emissions, and emissions per capita are still relatively low compared with other regions. However, minimizing the LAC region’s future carbon footprint will require new policies. Also, deforestation globally accounts for 20 percent of greenhouse gas emissions. The Amazon River Basin contains one of the world’s three most important rainforests, whose protection can therefore very significantly contribute to combating climate change. Brazil is pioneering the use of information technology to lessen deforestation in the Amazon.

#### Extinction

**Takacs ‘96** (David, The Idea Of Diversity: Philosophies Of Paradise, 1996, p. 200-1.)

So biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value and of itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and Wilson oblige us to think about the value of biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs’ rivet-popper trope makes this same point; by eliminating rivets, we play Russian roulette with global ecology and human futures: “It is likely that destruction of the rich complex of species in the Amazon basin could trigger rapid changes in global climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on stable climate, and human beings remain heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the extinction of perhaps a million species in the Amazon basin could have entrained famines in which a billion human beings perished. And if our species is very unlucky, the famines could lead to a thermonuclear war, which could extinguish civilization.” Elsewhere Ehrlich uses different particulars with no less drama: What then will happen if the current decimation of organic diversity continues? Crop yields will be more difficult to maintain in the face of climatic change, soil erosion , loss of dependable water supplies, decline of pollinators, and ever more serious assaults by pests. Conversion of productive land to wasteland will accelerate; deserts will continue their seemingly inexorable expansion. Air pollution will increase, and local climates will become harsher. Humanity will have to forgo many of the direct economic benefits it might have withdrawn from Earth's well­stocked genetic library. It might, for example, miss out on a cure for cancer; but that will make little difference. As ecosystem services falter, mortality from respiratory and epidemic disease, natural disasters, and especially famine will lower life expectancies to the point where can­cer (largely a disease of the elderly) will be unimportant. Humanity will bring upon itself consequences depressingly similar to those expected from a nuclear winter. Barring a nuclear conflict, it appears that civilization will disappear some time before the end of the next century - not with a bang but a whimper.

### 2

Their use of security is articulated through gendered binaries—that requires domination and elimination of those who threaten the dominant masculine body politic

Wilcox 3 [Lauren, PhD in IR @ University of Minnesota, BA @ Macalester College, MA @ London School of Economics, “Security Masculinity: The Gender-Security Nexus”, RCB]

Post-structuralists emphasize not only the discursive process of securitization, but the ways in which issues of identity factor into this process. ”Practicing security‘ entails specific state actions not just in external policies, but in internal politics as well. By labeling external threats, the state constructs a regime of identity by demarcating who and what is to be feared by ”us.‘ ”Security‘ implies not only specific actions, but specific implications for the identity of what is being ”secured‘. David Campbell argues in Writing Security: American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, that security is the raison d‘être of the state. He further notes hat—the state requires discourses of ”danger‘ to provide a new theology about who and what ”we‘ are by highlighting who or what ”we‘ are not, and what ”we‘ have to fear.“10 Thus, the process of ”securitizing‘ can also be a process to define a nation‘s identity by drawing boundaries between who and what is acceptable (on the ”inside‘) and what is unacceptable (on the ”outside‘). ”Security‘ is implicated in the production of dichotomies that structure the discipline and the way we think about international relations, such as inside/outside, self/other, us/them and sovereignty/anarchy. Much of this type of language was used in reference to terrorist and immigration, including the creation of a hierarchy between ”us‘ and ”them,‘ the criminalization and militarized responses, fears of internal subversion, and the discursive location of threats being outside the territory of the US.My understanding of ”security‘ and ”gender‘ is rooted in feminist contributions to international relations and security studies as well. Feminist scholarship informs my work in many ways, as feminist theorists, like critical theorists, attempt to, —make strange what has previously appeared familiar [and] to challenge us to question what has hitherto appeared as ”natural.‘ “11 Of key importance to this specific study are feminist scholars of IR who take the post-structuralist analysis further, and note how the dichotomies that constitute the field of international relations are so readily ”mapped onto‘ gender. Feminist scholar Charlotte Hooper‘s analysis of the gendered nature of the field of international relations is similar to Campbell‘s, noting how dichotomies such as active/passive, war/peace, and order/anarchy are assigned masculine and feminine traits, with the first being valued over the second. This use of the concept of gender is consistent with how ”gender‘ is used in this paper. The insights feminist post-structuralists provide into the gendered nature of the process of drawing borders between ”us‘ and ”them‘ and ”domestic‘ and ”foreign‘ are particularly relevant in the context of my research into the securitization of immigration and terrorism, as the discourses used in this context have clearly made these distinctions. They are also gendered discourses, as they rely on gendered dichotomies. My analysis of the gendered discourses of terrorism and immigration is based on this type of post-structuralist feminist analysis.Because of the prevalence of gendered dichotomies in IR and their role in constructing identities and boundaries, the practice of international relations and ”security‘ is inextricably linked to identity formation. Feminist scholars of international relations have noted the extensive association of masculinity and war, and have analyzed how war and IR and masculinities have been mutually constructed though military service, 12 and by several different kinds of ”hegemonic masculinities‘ that serve as the prototypical behavior for men indifferent contexts.13When writing of ”gender,‘ I want to make clear I do not equate this term to ”men and women‘ (or just women for that matter) but, as a system of asymmetrical social constructs of masculinity and femininity.14 While employing a gender analysis of issues such as militarization, war, and terrorism, I will not be addressing such issues as whether or not men or women are inherently violent or peaceful, or, in response to Francis Fukuyama, what would happen if women were our political leaders.15 Rather, I use to concept of gender as a symbolic system organizes many cultural discourses, and is mapped on to certain dichotomies, such as hard/soft, inside/outside, sovereignty/anarchy, active/passive, as I briefly explained above. As gender is a normative system in which the concept associated with masculinity in the dichotomy is considered more desirable, gender in International Relations also serves as a prescriptive formulation. This is not say that actual men and women are irrelevant to gender, but that gender as a discursive system represents men and women differently, and constructs different social spaces and functions for them. Race, class, and other variables are also part of a gender discourse that represents a feminine ”other‘ that deviates from the masculine ”norm‘. The concept of ”hegemonic masculinity‘ is also related to the concept of gender. This term, which is discussed at length in chapter three, indicates the prevailing definition of masculinity, driven by social and political trends and defined against subordinate masculinities, such as racial minorities and non-heterosexual orientations.

**The impact is Extinction**

**Warren and Cady 94**—Warren is the Chair of the Philosophy Department at Macalester College and Cady is Professor of Philosophy at Hamline University (Karen and Duane, “Feminism and Peace: Seeing Connections”, p. 16, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3810167.pdf)

Operationalized, the evidence of patriarchy as a dysfunctional system is found in the behaviors to which it gives rise, (c), and the unmanageability, (d), which results. For example, in the United States, current estimates are that one out of every three or four women will be raped by someone she knows; globally, rape, sexual harassment, spouse-beating, and sado-masochistic pornography are examples of behaviors practiced, sanctioned, or tolerated within patriarchy. In the realm of environmentally destructive behaviors, strip-mining, factory farming, and pollution of the air, water, and soil are instances of behaviors maintained and sanctioned within patriarchy. They, too, rest on the faulty beliefs that it is okay to "rape the earth," that it is "man's God-given right" to have dominion (that is, domination) over the earth, that nature has only instrumental value, that environmental destruction is the acceptable price we pay for "progress."And the presumption of warism, that war is a natural, righteous, and ordinary way to impose dominion on a people or nation, goes hand in hand with patriarchy and leads to dysfunctional behaviors of nations and ultimately to international unmanageability. Much of the current" unmanageability" of contemporary life in patriarchal societies, (d), is then viewed as a consequence of a patriarchal preoccupation with activities, events, and experiences that reflect historically male-gender identified beliefs, values, attitudes, and assumptions. Included among these real-life consequences are precisely those concerns with **nuclear proliferation, war, environmental destruction, and violence toward women**, which many feminists see as the logical outgrowth of patriarchal thinking. In fact, it is often only through observing these dysfunctional behaviors-the symptoms of dysfunctionality that one can truly see that and how patriarchy serves to maintain and perpetuate them. When patriarchy is understood as a dysfunctional system, this "unmanageability" can be seen for what it is-as a predictable and thus logical consequence of patriarchy.'1 The theme that global environmental crises, war, and violence generally are predictable and logical consequences of sexism and patriarchal culture is pervasive in ecofeminist literature (see Russell 1989, 2). Ecofeminist Charlene Spretnak, for instance, argues that "militarism and warfare are continual features of a patriarchal society because they reflect and instill patriarchal values and fulfill needs of such a system. Acknowledging the context of patriarchal conceptualizations that feed militarism is a first step toward reducing their impact and preserving life on Earth" (Spretnak 1989, 54). Stated in terms of the foregoing model of patriarchy as a dysfunctional social system, the claims by Spretnak and other feminists take on a clearer meaning: Patriarchal conceptual frameworks legitimate impaired thinking (about women, national and regional conflict, the environment) which is manifested in behaviors which, if continued, **will make life on earth difficult, if not impossible**. It is a stark message, but it is plausible. Its plausibility lies in understanding the conceptual roots of various woman-nature-peace connections in regional, national, and global contexts.

**Vote neg to reject the hegemonic masculinity inherent in the ideational process of the 1AC**

**Beland 2009**

Daniel Beland. “Gender, Ideational Analysis, and Social Policy” Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society. Vol 16 Num 4. Pp 558-581. Winter 2009

To further illustrate the role of frames in politics and policy change, let me discuss three ways in which political actors can mobilize them. First, **frames can take the form of a public discourse used by speciﬁc political actors to convince others that policy change is necessary.** This is what political scientist Robert H. Cox (2001) calls “the social construction of the need to reform” and what politi- cal philosopher Nancy Fraser (1989) has called the “politics of needs interpretation.” From this perspective, **discursive frames can help convince political actors and the general public that existing policy legacies are ﬂawed, and that reforms should be enacted to solve perceived social and economic problems.** Thus, **policy learning can feed framing processes in the sense that experts, ofﬁcials, and interest groups can publicly voice their negative assessments of exist- ing policies to convince other actors that the time has come to improve or even replace them.** But “social learning remains analyti- cally distinct from framing activities in part because learning can occur without the emergence of a public discourse about the need to reform. An autonomous set of evaluative activities, social learning generally predates and, in only some cases, informs framing pro- cesses” (Be´ land 2006, 562). Overall, **discursive frames help actors make a case for policy change, and this activity generally involves a public discussion of the meaning and performance of existing policy legacies.** Second, **these frames help political actors convince other groups and individuals to form a coalition around a concrete proposal or vision for change.** As discussed above, ideational processes partici- pate in the construction of interests and the ranking of policy goals. In this context, **particular political actors can use frames and politi- cal discourse to inﬂuence the way other actors see their interests and identify with shared policy goals.** From this perspective, **policy debates are largely about the construction of interests, policy goals, and identities, without which political coalitions can hardly survive.** Although concrete quid pro quos between key political actors are a major aspect of coalition building (Bonoli 2000), **frames can help sell concrete policy alternatives to the public and build a stronger coalition around them.** On one hand, politicians can “speak to their base” and argue that the measures they support are consistent with the broad ideological principles that cement their existing coalition. On the other hand, ambiguous policy ideas and proposals can make many different actors believe that they have an interest in supporting a complex policy alternative, which can lead to seemingly paradoxi- cal coalitions (Palier 2005). Third, political actors can mobilize framing processes to counter criticism targeting the policy alternatives they support. Thus, one might expand Weaver’s notion of blame avoidance strategies (Weaver 1986) to take on a discursive form. For instance, ofﬁcials may blame economic cycles for higher unemployment rates to con- vince the public that their decisions are not at the origin of this negative situation. **Policymakers can also frame policy alternatives in a way that diverts attention away from their actual departure from well-accepted political symbols or policy paradigms.** For example, since the 1980s, Swedish politicians have referred to enduringly popular idea of “social democracy” to legitimize forms of policy change that are arguably closer to neoliberalism than to traditional social democratic ideals (Cox 2004). Blame avoidance frames such as these have a preventive component because political actors use them to shield the policy alternatives they support from criticism (Be´ land 2005, 11). **Scholars interested in the gender – social policy nexus have long analyzed discursive and framing processes** (Tannen 1994), and their potential impact on policy change (Lewis 2002). A good example of this type of scholarship is the research of Hobson and Lindholm (1997) on the mobilization of Swedish women during the 1930s. In order to understand this mobilization, the authors bridge the power resource approach and the sociological scholarship on social movements. **Their analysis of women’s mobilization emphasizes the role of what they call “discursive resources,” a concept that “acknowledges that social groups engage in struggles over the mean- ings and the boundaries of political and social citizenship. This includes the cultural narratives and metaphors that social actors exploit in their public representations as well as the contesting ideological stances that they take on dominant themes and issues on the political agenda.”** (Hobson and Lindholm 1997, 479) For these two scholars, **ideational processes clearly serve as powerful framing tools in struggles over gender and social policy change.** Once again, **this discussion of the gender scholarship points to the relationship between ideational processes and categorical inequalities, a major issue that is frequently overlooked in the general ideational literature on policy and politics. By pointing to this key relationship, students of gender and social policy make a strong and original contribution to this ideational literature.**

### 3

#### TEXT: The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency should construct and operate a small modular nuclear reactor at the Department of Defense Installation Energy Test Bed.

#### **The test bed increases safety, overcomes barriers to deployment and commercializes SMRs**

Sarewitz and Thernstrom 12 (Daniel and Samuel - Consortium for Science, Policy, and Outcomes at Arizona State University, "ENERGY INNOVATION AT THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: ASSESSING THE OPPORTUNITIES,")

The **centerpiece** of DoD’s **innovation model** for facilities energy is its **Installation Energy Test Bed**. The test bed is designed to **demonstrate emerging energy technologies** in a real-world, integrated building environment in order to reduce risk, overcome barriers to deployment, and facilitate wide-scale commercialization. The test bed requires no new physical infrastructure; rather, it operates as a distributed activity whose key element is the **systematic evaluation of new technologies**, both to **determine their performance, operational readiness**, and life cycle costs, and to **provide guidance and design information** for future deployment across installations. The rationale is straightforward. New technologies offer the opportunity to cost-effectively reduce DoD’s facility energy demand by a dramatic amount and provide distributed generation to improve energy security. Absent outside validation, however, these new technologies will not be widely deployed in time for DoD to meet its energy goals and requirements, for the reasons discussed earlier. Because it has such a large stock of buildings, it is in DoD’s direct self-interest to help firms overcome the barriers to deployment and commercialization of their technologies. To overcome these barriers requires **demonstrations** that link emerging technology with real-world sites and end users in order to validate the technologies’ cost and performance. Demonstrations can operate both as a technology pull and a technology push—to both accelerate the deployment of emerging technologies and foster the final development of the next generation of energy technologies. As mentioned previously, DOE has historically had limited success in playing this role, at least in part because DOE is not a market for these technologies. DoD, in contrast, is **uniquely positioned** to play this role for itself and the nation at large, due to the breadth of its infrastructure, the size of its market, and its long-established culture of test and evaluation and early technology adoption.

#### **DARPA operations lead to commercialization and DOD adoption**

Hayward et al. 10 (Steven - American Enterprise Institute, Mark Muro - Brookings Institution, Ted Nordjaus and Michael Shellenberger - Breakthrough Institute, "How a limted a direct approach to energy innovation can deliver clean, cheap energy, economic productivity and national prosperity," <http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/Post-Partisan%20Power.pdf>)

In addition to fostering stronger linkages between government-funded research centers and private sector investors, entrepreneurs, and customers, the DOD can work to more closely **connect research efforts and the** growing **energy innovation** needs of the U.S. military. This close relationship between research efforts and DOD procurement and technology needs was central to the successful history of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), famous for inventing the Internet, GPS, and countless other technologies that have both improved the fighting capabilities of the U.S. military and launched many spin-off technologies American consumers and businesses now take for granted. DARPA program managers had a keen awareness of the technologies and innovations that could improve military capabilities and funded breakthrough innovations aligned with those needs. Once innovations matured into potentially useful technologies, the DOD was there as an early customer for these products, allowing entrepreneurial firms to secure market demand, scale-up production, and continue to improve their products. Congress made the right move in creating and funding an Advanced Research Projects Agency for Energy (ARPA-E) program modeled after the historic success of DARPA. ARPA-E resides within the DOE, however, which is not set up to be a major user of energy technologies. By contrast, DOD has both the opportunity and the urgent need to use many of these technologies.64 The DOD can and should play a greater role in administering ARPA-E and making sure that breakthrough energy discoveries become realworld technologies that can strengthen American energy security, enhance the capabilities of the U.S. military, and spin off to broader commercial use. Fiscal year 2011 funding requests for the ARPA-E program are currently a modest $300 million, just onetenth the annual budget for DARPA research.65 Truly bringing the DARPA model to the energy sector would imply scaling ARPA-E up to match DARPA. Given the multi-trillion dollar scale of the energy industry, only funding levels on this order of magnitude will have a significant impact on the pace of energy innovation and entrepreneurship. We recommend scaling up funding for ARPA-E over the next five years to $1.5 billion annually, with a significant portion of this funding dedicated to dual-use energy technology innovations with the potential to enhance energy security and strengthen the U.S. military. DOD and DOE should extend and expand their current Memorandum of Understanding, established in July 2010,66 and launch an active partnership between ARPA-E and DOD to determine and select nascent dual-use breakthrough energy innovations for funding through the ARPA-E program and potential adoption and procurement by the DOD. 3 Reform Energy Subsidies and Use Militar y Procurement and Competitive Deployment Incentives to Drive Price Declines **The government has a long history of successfully driving innovation** and price declines in emerging technologies by acting directly as a demanding customer to spur the early commercialization and largescale deployment of cutting-edge technologies. From radios and microchips to lasers and camera lenses, the federal government, in particular the DOD, has helped catalyze the improvement of countless innovative technologies and supported the emergence of vibrant American industries in the process.67 Yet today’s mess of **open-ended energy subsidies reward production of more of the same product, not innovation**. The federal government showers subsidies across many energy options, from oil and coal to ethanol and wind power. **None** of these efforts, however, are designed or optimized to drive and reward innovation and ensure the prices of these technologies fall over time, making the subsidies effectively permanent. This must change. Competitive Deployment Incentives The current energy subsidy and deployment framework should be turned on its head. Government investments succeed not when they are blanket subsidies but rather when they are narrowly targeted to specific outcomes, such as developing computers to allow for rocket systems, building a communications network to survive a nuclear attack, or creating increasingly efficient and powerful jet engines. These public investments paid off handsomely in personal computers, the Internet, and gas turbines used in both commercial air travel as well as modern natural gas power plants.68 In an era of expanding federal debt, across-the-board energy subsidy reform should be pursued. Incentives for energy technology deployment should be targeted and disciplined. Technologies should receive competitive deployment incentives only to the extent that they are becoming cheaper in unsubsidized terms over time. The strategy that we propose would be aimed at low-carbon technologies that, at a minimum, satisfy the following criteria:  The technology has been demonstrated and has proven technical feasibility at commercial scale;  Is currently priced above normal market rates and is locked out of markets by more mature, entrenched technology competitors;  Has potential for significant and sustained cost and performance improvements during deployment and scale-up; #Has strong prospects for significant market penetration once the technology reaches competitive prices. Targeted and competitive deployment incentives could be created for various classes of energy technologies to ensure that each has a chance to mature. Incentive levels should fall at regular intervals, terminating if the technology class either fails to improve in price or reaches cost parity in the absence of any further incentives. Structured in this manner, reformed national energy deployment incentives will not select winners and losers, nor will it create permanently subsidized industries. These public investments will instead provide opportunity for all emerging low-carbon energy technologies to demonstrate progress toward competitive costs while increasing the rate at which early-stage clean and affordable energy technologies are commercialized. Military Procurement In addition to reforming energy deployment subsidies and launching a new competitive deployment strategy, the nation should once again leverage the power of federal procurement to establish demanding requirements to drive innovation and improvement in new energy technologies. The DOD has a long track record of using the power of procurement to successfully drive the commercialization and improvement of new technologies, many of which later spun off into broader commercial adoption. In contrast, the DOE has no way to either procure or use energy technologies at commercial scale. The DOD should help fill this void, once again using procurement to advance a range of potential dual-use energy innovations. The Pentagon’s 2010 “Quadrennial Defense Review” prioritizes expanded DOD involvement in energy innovation—and with good reason.69 The U.S. military today uses more oil than Sweden and more electricity than Denmark. Every $10 increase in the price of oil costs the DOD more than $1 billion dollars, sapping money that should be used to equip our troops for critical missions at home and abroad.70 With fuel convoys costing both lives and money every day in Iraq and Afghanistan, questions of energy are understandably high on the list of Pentagon priorities, and a growing community of national security experts, including both active and retired generals and flag officers, has identified the development of new energy alternatives that can both reduce America’s exposure to volatile oil markets and enhance military operational capabilities as key to securing the nation’s defense.71 Congress should provide new funds necessary to secure America’s energy future and national defense, providing up to $5 billion annually (as needed) to support DOD efforts to procure, demonstrate, test, validate, and improve a suite of cutting-edge energy technologies with potential to enhance American energy security or improve the strategic and tactical capabilities of the American armed forces. Energy technologies with clear dual-use commercial and military potential well suited to DOD procurement could include: advanced biofuels, including aviation fuels; advanced solar thermal and photovoltaic power technologies; improved batteries; electric vehicles; and new, modular nuclear reactors (discussed in greater detail below). As discussed above, DOD should work closely with ARPA-E and other research initiatives in both DOD and DOE to ensure a steady flow of energy innovation geared towards military needs. Procurement contracts should require continued innovation and cost improvements from supplying firms and should be competitively awarded. New efforts should be pursued to ensure that innovative firms both large and small can participate in procurement contracts and the military can benefit from the best American innovations, no matter where they arise.72 Embrace the Potential of Nuclear — But Pursue a Portfolio A new generation of smaller, innovative nuclear reactors holds great promise in providing affordable, reliable, zero-carbon power and heat to utilities of all sizes, industrial facilities, and military bases. For decades, small reactors between one-tenth to one-twentieth the size of existing commercial nuclear plants have powered U.S. aircraft carriers and submarine fleets. New modular commercial reactor designs based on the same reliable technology are smaller, safer, and less expensive than older designs and have the potential to be affordably mass-manufactured. Such technologies also offer the possibility of greater applicability globally and could potentially represent a new high-value, export-oriented manufacturing industry for the U.S. economy. A new generation of more advanced designs may hold even greater promise for the future.73 Modular reactor designs should receive priority attention from the Departments of Energy and Defense, who can each work to research advanced reactor technologies, license and approve new commercial modular reactor designs, and procure and **demonstrate small modular reactors at** DOE nuclear facilities and **DOD military bases**.

#### Government guarantees create moral hazard - creates risky market structures- causes instability and turns case

Gerdin ’11 (Erik Gerding, Associate Professor at University of Colorado Law School. His research interests include securities, banking law, financial regulation generally, and corporate governance, “The Inherent, Ineluctable Instability of Financial Institution Regulation”, <http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/09/the-inherent-ineluctable-instability-of-financial-institution-regulation.html>, September 12, 2011)

Here is my second contribution to the Faculty Lounge Online Forum on the legislative and regulatory process of financial reform. Check out the posts by the other contributors including, Kim Krawiec (Duke), Christie Ford (Univ. British Columbia), Brett McDonnell (Minnesota), Saule Omarova (North Carolina), and Dan Schwarz (Minnesota). In my last post, I concluded that the presence of government subsidies – particularly guarantees explicit (deposit insurance) and implicit (Too-Big-To-Fail) – makes the political economy of financial institution regulation different from other areas of the regulatory state. In this post, I argue that these government subsidies and moreover, the underlying reason for government subsidies, contributes to the inherent instability of financial institution regulation. The presence of government guarantees – explicit or implicit – creates strong incentives for financial firms to externalize the cost of their risk taking onto taxpayers. But there is more to government guarantees than moral hazard. Consider the following: Market distortion: When the government subsidizes some financial firms but not others, it distorts the market. A lower cost of capital allows the subsidized firms to undercut their competition. This can drive competitors either out of business or, if risk is being mispriced because of an asset boom, into riskier market segments (a phenomena I explored in a symposium piece). Cheaper debt and leverage: Government guarantees also. make debt cheaper than equity This supercharges the incentives of financial firms to increase leverage. Higher leverage of financial institutions, in turn, works to increase the effective supply of money. More money can fuel asset price bubbles and mask the mispricing of risk (phenomena explored by Margaret Blair in this paper, as well as by me in a forthcoming symposium piece in the Berkeley Business Law Journal.) Cheaper debt and regulatory capital arbitrage: Cheaper debt also supercharges financial firm incentives to game regulatory capital requirements (something I am writing about in the context of the shadow banking system. See also Jones; Acharya & Schnabl; Acharya & Richardson. Bailouts and correlated risk: Governments face pressure to bail out firms when their risk taking is highly correlated (because multiple firms will fail at the same time). On the flip side, this creates a strong incentive for financial firms to take on correlated risk. (See, e.g., Acharya et al.). Correlated risk taking reinforces the kind of herding that behavioral finance scholars have analyzed in the context of asset price bubbles. So feedback loops abound. What to do, then, about government subsidies? “Stop us before we bail out again” One approach is to erect barriers to the government providing subsidies and bailouts. Dodd-Frank is chock full o’ provisions that aim to do just this. But legal scholars need to give policymakers a dose of reality about the ability of law to hardwire “no bailouts, no subsidies.” I just came back from a conference last week in which a number of economists kept saying that this hardwiring was exactly what law needed to contribute to financial reform. Here is how some of the law professors in the room (including your friend and mine Anna Gelpern) responded: 1. Legal rules are by nature incomplete and, under pressure, firms and regulators will seek ways around rules. 2. It ain’t so easy for a sovereign to bind itself. In the end, what is the remedy and who will enforce it? 3. There is nothing to stop Congress from amending the law. Legislatures can’t entrench laws against amendments by future legislatures (although the government must honor contractual obligations – for a discussion of these issues, see U.S. v. Winstar) True, Dodd-Frank’s prohibitions on bailouts and governments are not just pieces of paper. Law does constrain government behavior to a degree and can promote political accountability. However, we should not expect “law” to work like a wind-up toy that is self-executing without worrying about issues of interpretation, compliance, incentives, and the norms of government actors. I restrained myself at the conference from delivering a little legal koan: “the law will bind government officials, if they believe it binds them.” As an aside: it strikes me that the legal academy has to do a much better job of educating economists, policy makers and the public about what is “law” and how it operates. We have to do this in an accessible manner and without undermining important norms of legal compliance. Financial reform proposals are replete with calls for more “automatic regulations” – whether to counter capture or political pressure to spike the economic punch when the party gets startin’. (For example, economists have proposed the very sensible policy of counter-cyclical capital buffers) But fetishizing automatic regulations can pervert financial regulation. Over-reliance on automatic regulation: Ignores the fact that regulators and lawmakers must interpret laws; and Discounts the likelihood or regulatory arbitrage or regulatory evasion. In short, we need to have a much richer discussion of what the “law in action” means. Letting it Burn: Confusing Bailouts with Other Externalities of Financial Institution Risk-Taking What if restrictions on bailouts and government guarantees work too well? There is a rationale for government interventions like deposit insurance, lender-of-last resort, and bailouts. They are not just about “capture.” Financial institution failure can impose significant negative externalities (which is a fairly antiseptic description of the social costs of financial crises). Counterparty and market discipline don’t force firms to internalize all of these externalities. I respect the intellectual consistency and fervor of those who believe that bailouts and government interventions are the root of all financial regulatory problems. But I wouldn’t trust them in any position of responsibility. Deposit insurance and bailouts aren’t the only ways governments distort markets when they act to avoid crises. Lender-of-last resort actions and even interest rates changes can create a type of moral hazard (see “Put, Greenspan”). It is a lot harder for central banks to calibrate liquidity responses to market seizures than armchair critics think. Countering Subsidies So if some government subsidization of the financial firms is inevitable, it is critical that the government counter these subsidies -- whether by limiting firm risk-taking or charging firms for the subsidy. Absent attempts to counter subsidies, we are right back where this post started – moral hazard, distortion, cheap debt --> leverage and capital arbitrage.

#### Community relations key to prevent encroachment – undermines training and readiness.

Amanda Boccuti, Lauren Faul, and Lauren Gray, 5/21/2012. Analyst for Marstel-Day, LLC, providing analysis and GIS support for U.S. Marine Corps projects; analyst for Marstel-Day, LLC, specializing in Strategic Communications. Her primary responsibilities entail the development of engagement plans for the U.S. Marine Corps which will provide them a framework to sustain the missions through community outreach and engagement; and researcher at Marstel-Day, LLC, offering research and analysis of environmental issues for encroachment control plans and communications, outreach and engagement strategies for the U.S. Marine Corps. “Establishing Creative Strategies for Effective Engagement Between Military Installations and Communities,” Engaging Cities, http://engagingcities.com/article/establishing-creative-strategies-effective-engagement-between-military-installations-communi.

Throughout the Nation’s history, military installations and ranges were historically established in undeveloped areas, except for those forts located to defend cities. Local communities developed near the installations for safety and economic reasons resulting in the installation being the up-to-that-point rural community’s primary economic engine. Routine communication between the installations and local communities were minimal because the installation was self-supporting and not subject to local laws and regulations. Communications were primarily social. Starting in the post-World War II era and accelerating as the 20th Century came to a close, installation-adjacent communities increased in both density and size – becoming less rural, more suburban or urban, and more economically diverse. Military missions continue to evolve, incorporating new weapon platforms and **training over larger areas** and at all hours of the day and night. These changes in both surrounding communities and the installation missions have often lead to competing interests with respect to the economy, natural resource management, and land use. Military installations and local communities must, therefore, focus communication efforts on building partnerships to find mutually acceptable paths forward for resolving their competing interests. Developing collaborative relationships is imperative to turning otherwise conflicting interests into opportunities for mutually beneficial solutions. The nature of those interactions is defined by issue type, installation and community rapport, and available communication channels. The four military services (i.e., Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force) have service-specific community engagement programs to develop partnerships; all four, however, conduct information sharing through the Public Affairs Office (PAO), which handles media and public relations. Three of the services – the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force – have established encroachment management policies that outline service responsibilities to establish, maintain, and sustain community relationships in order to reduce encroachment effects. This responsibility is usually assigned to a Community Plans and Liaison Office (CPLO) or an equivalent community planner. The CPLO and PAO work with their installation Commander to act as the military’s voice and point of engagement in the community through consistent messaging, establishing an installation presence in community forums, and planning community-engagement events and processes. Though Department of Defense (DoD) mechanisms exist to **develop community partnerships**, **mediating the different interests and priorities among military installations** and their surrounding communities is a complex, nuanced process usually exercised by the services, through their installation leadership. Siting of renewable energy projects, environmental stewardship responsibilities, noise from training events, and other policy- and planning-related matters invoke difficult questions, such as: how can an installation and its surrounding communities concurrently pursue goals and development in a way that lead to mutual gain, obtaining threshold requirements and fair compromise? Finding interest nexuses and fostering an open, strong relationship in which those nexuses can be explored is key.

#### Readiness key to deter conflict.

Spencer 0 (Jack, Policy Analyst for Defense and National Security in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation. “The Facts About Military Readiness,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2000/09/bg1394-the-facts-about-military-readiness)

Military readiness is **vital** because declines in America's military readiness **signal to the rest of the world** that **the United States is not prepared to defend its interests**. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby **preserving peace**.

### China

**No escalation Asian instability**

**Desker 8** (Barry, Dean – S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, “Why War is Unlikely in Asia: Facing the Challenge from China”, 6-4, http://www.iiss.org/conferences/asias-strategic-challenges-in-search-of-a-common-agenda/conference-papers/fifth-session-conflict-in-asia/why-war-in-asia-remains-unlikely-barry-desker/)

**War in Asia** is thinkable but it **is unlikely**. The **Asia-Pacific** region **can**, paradoxically, **be regarded as a zone** both of relative insecurity and **of relative strategic stability**. On the one hand, the region contains some of the world’s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen glacier – where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of resulting in a major war. The region is replete with border issues, the site of acts of terrorism (the Bali bombings, Manila superferry bombing, Kashmir, etc.), and it is an area of overlapping maritime claims (the Spratly Islands, Diaoyutai islands, etc). Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance, sitting astride key sea lines of communication (SLOCS) and important chokepoints. Nevertheless, the Asia-Pacific region is more stable than one might believe. Separatism remains a challenge but **the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism** is a nuisance but its impact **is contained. The** North Korean **nuclear issue**, while not fully resolved, **is** at least **moving toward** a conclusion with the likely **denuclearization** of the peninsula. **Tensions** between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, **seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict** (especially after the KMT victories in Taiwan). **The region** also **possesses significant multilateral structures** such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the nascent Six Party Talks forum and, in particular, ASEAN, and institutions such as the EAs, ASEAN + 3, ARF which ASEAN has conceived.

#### They can’t export – there’s no international licensing standard

ITA’ 11 – International Trade Administration (U.S. Department of Commerce, February. Manufacturing and Services Competitiveness Report. “The Commercial Outlook for U.S. Small Modular Nuclear Reactors.” http://trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg\_ian/@nuclear/documents/webcontent/tg\_ian\_003185.pdf)

Some U.S. suppliers also regard the **lack of international licensing standards as an obstacle** to expanding their business. They say that obtaining regulatory approval in one market does not provide any “leg up” in obtaining approval in another market, which means that the **process has to be repeated for *each* country** that the supplier wants to sell to. However, it is **difficult** to see how international licensing standards could be developed or enforced given the ***unique*** national circumstances that factor into a regulator’s licensing decision- making. The discretion of these national regulators cannot be compromised. More generally, U.S. sup- pliers also say that the lack of regulatory infrastructure in many countries interested in SMR technology is a problem for ensuring the safe and secure deployment of the technology. This challenge also applies to larger, traditional reactors.

#### International tariffs take out this advantage – this evidence is comparative

ITA’ 11 – International Trade Administration (U.S. Department of Commerce, February. Manufacturing and Services Competitiveness Report. “The Commercial Outlook for U.S. Small Modular Nuclear Reactors.” http://trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg\_ian/@nuclear/documents/webcontent/tg\_ian\_003185.pdf)

Some U.S. suppliers also note that the United States currently levies tariffs between 3.3 percent and 5.2 percent on key nuclear reactor components, but the tariffs are currently suspended in some cases (specifically for reactor pressure vessels and steam turbine generators that were ordered before July 31, 2006). Tariffs around the world, particularly in the European Union and South Korea, are higher on such components. Coupled with **significant foreign government support**, foreign suppliers can more easily enter the U.S. market, while U.S. manufacturers face a significant trade barrier in key foreign markets.

#### United States can’t export – means there’s no tradeoff with the China Makret

ITA’ 11 – International Trade Administration (U.S. Department of Commerce, February. Manufacturing and Services Competitiveness Report. “The Commercial Outlook for U.S. Small Modular Nuclear Reactors.” http://trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg\_ian/@nuclear/documents/webcontent/tg\_ian\_003185.pdf)

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### Work Force

#### No scenario for losing deterrence

Kristensen, 12 -- FAS nuclear weapons expert

[Hans, "DOD: Strategic Stability Not Threatened Even by Greater Russian Nuclear Forces," FAS, 10-10-12, www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2012/10/strategicstability.php, accessed 1-27-13, mss]

DOD: Strategic Stability Not Threatened Even by Greater Russian Nuclear Forces

A Department of Defense (DOD) report on Russian nuclear forces, conducted in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence and sent to Congress in May 2012, concludes that even the most worst-case scenario of a Russian surprise disarming first strike against the United States would have “little to no effect” on the U.S. ability to retaliate with a devastating strike against Russia. I know, even thinking about scenarios such as this sounds like an echo from the Cold War, but the Obama administration has actually come under attack from some for considering further reductions of U.S. nuclear forces when Russia and others are modernizing their forces. The point would be, presumably, that reducing while others are modernizing would somehow give them an advantage over the United States. But the DOD report concludes that Russia “would not be able to achieve a militarily significant advantage by any plausible expansion of its strategic nuclear forces, even in a cheating or breakout scenario under the New START Treaty” (emphasis added). The conclusions are important because the report come after Vladimir Putin earlier this year announced plans to produce “over 400” new nuclear missiles during the next decade. Putin’s plan follows the Obama administration’s plan to spend more than $200 billion over the next decade to modernize U.S. strategic forces and weapons factories. The conclusions may also hint at some of the findings of the Obama administration’s ongoing (but delayed and secret) review of U.S. nuclear targeting policy. No Effects on Strategic Stability The DOD report – Report on the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation Pursuant to Section 1240 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 – was obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. It describes the U.S. intelligence community’s projection for the likely development of Russian nuclear forces through 2017 and 2022, the timelines of the New START Treaty, and possible implications for U.S. national security and strategic stability. Much of the report’s content was deleted before release – including general and widely reported factual information about Russian nuclear weapons systems that is not classified. But the important concluding section that describes the effects of possible shifts in the number and composition of Russian nuclear forces on strategic stability was released in its entirety. The section “Effects on Strategic Stability” begins by defining that stability in the strategic nuclear relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation depends upon the assured capability of each side to deliver a sufficient number of nuclear warheads to inflict unacceptable damage on the other side, even with an opponent attempting a disarming first strike. Consequently, the report concludes, “the only Russian shift in its nuclear forces that could undermine the basic framework of mutual deterrence that exists between the United States and the Russian Federation is a scenario that enables Russia to deny the United States the assured ability to respond against a substantial number of highly valued Russian targets following a Russian attempt at a disarming first strike” (emphasis added). The DOD concludes that such a first strike scenario “will most likely not occur.” But even if it did and Russia deployed additional strategic warheads to conduct a disarming first strike, even significantly above the New START Treaty limits, DOD concludes that it “would have little to no effects on the U.S. assured second-strike capabilities that underwrite our strategic deterrence posture” (emphasis added). In fact, the DOD report states, the “Russian Federation…would not be able to achieve a militarily significant advantage by any plausible expansion of its strategic nuclear forces, even in a cheating or breakout scenario under the New START Treaty, primarily because of the inherent survivability of the planned U.S. Strategic force structure, particularly the OHIO-class ballistic missile submarines, a number of which are at sea at any given time.” Implications These are BIG conclusions with BIG implications. They reaffirm conclusions made by DOD in 2010 [http://www.foreign.senate.gov/publications/download/executive-report-111-06-treaty-with-russia-on-measures-for-further-reduction-and-limitation-of-strategic-offensive-arms-the-new-start-treaty], but the new report is important because it comes after Russia earlier this year announced plans to produce “over 400” nuclear missiles over the next decade. In the real world, however, Russian nuclear forces are not increasing. Even with Putin’s missile production plan, simultaneous retirement of older missile will continue the downward trend and result in a net reduction of Russian strategic nuclear forces over the next decade and a half. This fact has not stopped some from arguing against additional U.S. nuclear reductions. Their argument is that reductions are unwise at a time when Russia and others are modernizing their nuclear forces. Others have even argued that Russia could break out of the New START Treaty by cheating and presumably achieve some strategic advantage. Even the U.S. Senate’s advice and consent resolution that in 2010 approved the New START Treaty required that “the President should regulate reductions in United States strategic offensive arms so that the number of accountable strategic offensive arms under the New START Treaty possessed by the Russian Federation in no case exceeds the comparable number of accountable strategic offensive arms possessed by the United States to such an extent that a strategic imbalance endangers the national security interests of the United States” (emphasis added). A similar obsession with numbers was echoed in the 2012 report by the State Department’s International Strategic Advisory Board on future U.S.-Russian “Mutual Assured Stability,” which concluded that it requires some “rough parity” of nuclear forces. (A similar number obsession has evolved with NATO about non-strategic nuclear weapons, but that’s another story). But the DOD report appears to conclude that such warnings and parity requirement are missing the point. Strategic stability and deterrence today are provided by a secure retaliatory capability, primarily ballistic missile submarines. In fact, although ICBMs and bombers also play a role in the U.S. nuclear posture, they seem oddly absent from the report’s description of what is required to maintain strategic stability based on a sufficient secure retaliatory capability. Retaining that capability, it seems, does not even require the ballistic missile submarines to be on alert (although the report doesn’t explicitly say so). It only requires that a sufficient number of submarines “are at sea” and secure at any given time – or perhaps even only in a crisis. Likewise, the conclusion that a Russian disarming first strike “will most likely not occur” may be obvious to most but, if formal, seems to remove the need for having ICBMs on alert, as long as a sufficient number of submarines are at sea to provide the basic deterrence that underpins strategic stability.

#### Nuclear not key

Beckley, 12 **--** Harvard Belfer Center International Security research fellow

(Michael, research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, he will become an assistant professor of political science at Tufts University in the fall of 2012, "China's Century?" International Security, Winter 11/12, l/n, accessed 2-9-12, mss)

The RAND study found that nuclear weapons were of less importance than conventional capabilities for national influence. Thus, I do not consider them in the following analyses. The authors of the RAND study explain: " Even though nuclear weapons have become the ultima ratio regum in international politics, their relative inefficacy in most situations other than those involving national survival implies that their utility will continue to be significant but **highly restricted**. The ability to conduct different and sophisticated forms of conventional warfare will, therefore, remain the critical index of national power because of its undiminished utility, flexibility, responsiveness and credibility." n82

#### No retal to terror – popular support is against it

**Jenkins-Smith 4** (Hank C., Ph.D., Professor of Government – Texas A&M University, and Kerry G. Herron, Ph.D., Research Scientist – Texas A&M University, Fall)

Our final contrasting set of expectations relate to the degree to which the public will support or demand retribution against terrorists and supporting states. Here our **data show that** **support for using** conventional **U.S. military force to retaliate against terrorists** initially averaged above midscale, but **did not reach a high level of emotional demand** for military action. **Initial support declined significantly across all demographic and belief categories by the time of our survey in 2002**. Furthermore, **panelists** both in 2001 and 2002 **preferred** that **high levels of certainty about culpability** (above 8.5 on a scale from zero to ten) be established **before taking military action.** Again, we find the weight of evidence supporting revisionist expectations of public opinion. Overall, these **results are inconsistent with the contention that highly charged events will result in volatile and unstructured responses among mass publics** that prove problematic for policy processes. The initial response to the terrorist strikes, in the immediate aftermath of the event, demonstrated a broad and consistent shift in public assessments toward a greater perceived threat from terrorism, and greater willingness to support policies to reduce that threat. But **even in the highly charged context of such a serious attack on the American homeland, the overall public response was quite measured** . On average, the public showed very little propensity to undermine speech protections, and initial willing-ness to engage in military retaliation moderated significantly over the following year.

#### No motivation to use nukes

**Roberts and Moodie 2** (Brad and Michael, Headed the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute and Served as Assistant Director for Multilateral Affairs @ US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, President of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, “Biological Weapons: Toward a Threat Reduction Strategy,” Book)

**The argument about terrorist motivation is** also **important. Terrorists generally have not killed as many as they have been capable of killing.** This **restraint seems to derive from** an **understanding of mass casualty attacks as both unnecessary and counterproductive.** They are unnecessary because **terrorists, by and large, have succeeded by conventional means.** Also, they are counterproductive because **they might alienate key constituencies**, whether among the public, state sponsors, or the terrorist leadership group. In Brian Jenkins' famous words, **terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead**. Others have argued that the lack of mass casualty terrorism and effective exploitation of BW has been more a matter of accident and good fortune than capability or intent. Adherents of this view, including former Secretary of Defense William Cohen, argue that "it's not a matter of if but when." The attacks of September 11 would seem to settle the debate about whether terrorists have both the motivation and sophistication to exploit weapons of mass destruction for their full lethal effect. After all, those were terrorist attacks of unprecedented sophistication that seemed clearly aimed at achieving mass casualties--had the World Trade Center towers collapsed as the 1993 bombers had intended, perhaps as many as 150,000 would have died. Moreover, Osama bin Laden's constituency would appear to be not the "Arab street" or some other political entity but his god. And terrorists answerable only to their deity have proven historically to be among the most lethal. But this debate cannot be considered settled. **Bin Laden** and his followers **could have killed many more on September 11 if killing** as many as possible **had been their primary objective**. They now face the core dilemma of asymmetric warfare: how to escalate without creating new interests for the stronger power and thus the incentive to exploit its power potential more fully. **Asymmetric adversaries want their stronger enemies fearful, not fully engaged**--militarily or otherwise. They seek to win by preventing the stronger partner from exploiting its full potential. **To kill millions in America** with biological or other weapons **would only commit the United States-**-and much of the rest of the international community-**-to the annihilation of the perpetrators.**

#### No CBW Impact - Tech hurdles check

**Mueller 6** (John, Chair of National Security Studies – Mershon Center and Professor of Political Science – Ohio State University, Overblown, p. 24)

Not only has the science about chemical and biological weapons been quite sophisticated for more than a century, but that science has become massively more developed over that period. Moreover, **govern­ments** (not just small terrorist groups) **have spent a great deal of money** over decades in an effort to make the weapons more effective. **Yet**, although there have been great improvements in the lethality, effective­ness, and deployment of conventional and nuclear weapons during that time, **the difficulties of controlling and dispersing c**hemical and **biological substances seem to have persisted.** Perhaps dedicated terrorists will, in time, figure it out. However, the experience in the 1990s of the Japanese cult **Aum Shinrikyo** suggests there are great difficulties. The group **had** some **300 scientists** in its employ **and** an estimated budget of **$1 billion, and** it reportedly **tried** at least **nine times** over five years **to set off bio**logical **weapons** by spray­ing pathogens from trucks and wafting them from rooftops, hoping fancifully to ignite an apocalyptic war**. These efforts failed to create a single fatality**; in fact, nobody even noticed that the attacks had taken place. It was at that point that the group abandoned its biological efforts in frustration and instead turned to the infamous sarin chemical attack.29 As two analysts stress, there have been so few **bio**logical (and **chem**­ical) **terrorist attacks** because they **would require overcoming several major technological hurdles**. Among them: **gaining access to special**ized **ingredients, acquiring equipment and know-how** to produce and dis­perse the agents, **and creating an organization that can resist** infiltration or early **detection** by law enforcement."In the meantime, the science with respect to detecting and ably responding to such attacks is likely to grow. Although acknowledging that things could change in the future, the Gilmore Commission has concluded, "As easy as some argue that it may be for terrorists to culture anthrax spores or brew up a concoction of deadly nerve gas, the **effective dissemination** or dispersal of these viruses and poisons **still presents seri­ous technological hurdles** that greatly inhibit their effective use.

#### Prolif doesn’t cause war

**Waltz 03** [Kenneth, Emeritus Professor of IR at Berkeley, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 27-9]

**An opponent who attacks** what is unambiguously mine **risks suffering** great distress **if I have second-strike forces**. This statement has important implications for both the deter­rer and the deterred. Where territorial claims are shadowy and disputed, deterrent writs do not run. As Steven J. Rosen has said, "It is difficult to imagine Israel committing national suicide to hold on to Abu Rudeis or Hebron or Mount Hermon." 27 Establishing the credibility of a deterrent force requires moderation of territorial claims on the part of the would-be deterrer. For modest states, weapons whose very existence works strongly against their use are just what is wanted.**In a nuclear world**, conservative **would-be attackers will be prudent**, but will would-be attackers be conservative? A new Hitler is not unimaginable. Would the presence of nuclear weapons have moderated Hitler's behavior? Hitler did not start World War II in order to destroy the Third Reich. Indeed, he was dismayed by British and French declarations of war on Poland's behalf. After all, the western democracies had not come to the aid of a geographically defensible and militarily strong Czechoslovakia. Why then should they have declared war on behalf of an indefensible Poland and against a Germany made stronger by the incorporation of Czechoslo­vakia's armor? From the occupation of the Rhineland in 1936 to the invasion of Poland in 1939, Hitler's calculations were realistically made. In those years, Hitler would have been deterred from acting in ways that immediately threatened massive death and widespread destruction in Germany. And, even if Hitler had not been deterred, would his generals have obeyed his commands? **In a nuclear world, to act in blatantly offensive ways is madness.** Under the circumstances, how many generals would obey the commands of a madman? One man alone does not make war. To believe that nuclear deterrence would have worked against Germany in 1939 is easy. It is also easy to believe that in 1945, given the ability to do so, Hitler and some few around him would have fired nuclear warheads at the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union as their armies advanced, whatever the consequences for Germany. Two considerations work against this possibility: the first applies in any world; the second in a nuclear world. First, when defeat is seen to be inevitable, a ruler's authority may vanish. Early in 1945, Hitler apparently ordered the initiation of gas warfare, but his generals did not respond. 28 Second, no country will press a nuclear nation to the point of decisive defeat. In the despera­tion of defeat, desperate measures may be taken, and the last thing anyone wants to do is to make a nuclear nation desper­ate. The unconditional surrender of a nuclear nation cannot be demanded. Nuclear weapons affect the deterrer as well as the deterred.

#### U.S. manufacturing is resurgent---slew of factors make it sustainable and immune to a double-dip

PWC 9-21 – Pricewaterhouse Coopers, “A Homecoming For U.S. Manufacturing?,” 9/21/12, http://www.manufacturing.net/articles/2012/09/a-homecoming-for-us-manufacturing?et\_cid=2861124&et\_rid=279915960&linkid=http%3a%2f%2fwww.manufacturing.net%2farticles%2f2012%2f09%2fa-homecoming-for-us-manufacturing

NEW YORK― Consensus views on a U.S. manufacturing resurgence have largely centered on rising labor costs in markets such as China as the key driver of re-shoring back to the U.S. However, a new PwC US report, A Homecoming for U.S. Manufacturing?, reveals that while rising labor costs are part of the story, **a range of factors**—including transportation and energy costs and protecting the supply chain—could drive a **sustained manufacturing renaissance** in the U.S. **beyond any cyclical recovery**, potentially improving investment, employment, production output and research & development (R&D). PwC’s new report identifies **seven factors**—including **transportation** and **energy costs**; **currency** fluctuations; U.S. **market demand**; **labor costs**; U.S. **talent**; availability of **capital**; and the **tax and regulatory climate**—as the primary catalysts influencing manufacturers' decisions to establish production facilities domestically and produce products closer to their major customer bases. PwC's report also notes that localizing production can mitigate supply chain disruptions, which totaled $2.2 billion in financial impact for U.S. industrial products companies in 2011. “The **reviving industrial manufacturing sector is instrumental to U.S. economic recovery,”** said Bob McCutcheon, PwC’s U.S. Industrial Products leader. “Beyond the cyclical rebound, however, a host of **structural changes** is emerging that may lead to the U.S. becoming an important location for basing production and R&D facilities for several industries. In addition to trends in labor costs, other factors include the need to reduce transportation and energy costs; the emergence of the U.S. as a more attractive exporter and the relative attractiveness of the U.S. markets.”

#### Alt cause- labor shortages and currency manipulation

Markowitz, 12 -- Inc. reporter

(Eric, "Exposing the Myths About American Manufacturing," Inc., 2-1-12, www.inc.com/eric-markowitz/exposing-the-great-myths-about-american-manufacturing.html, accessed 10-3-12, mss)

Although the tide may be beginning to turn for local manufacturing, the situation for American manufacturers is still far from ideal. Currently, there are two major problems that American manufacturers confront on a daily basis: currency manipulation, and a lack of qualified American workers. Currency manipulation has been around for years. From 2008 to 2010, for example, China had pegged the yuan to the dollar, which kept its value artificially low. It also made Chinese exports cheap for American companies, who assemble—not manufacture—their products domestically. On one side, Waddell explains, are large corporations such as Whirlpool that outsource their material manufacturing to China, as well as the banks that invest in these companies. These groups have strong lobbies in Washington, which have prevented any major legislation from passing through. "All of those components are made in China, so anything that makes China less competitive hurts them," he says The other side, of course, are small and medium-sized manufacturing plants that see clients finding cheaper materials overseas. Legislation—some as recent as October 2011—has been introduced to combat currency manipulation, but politicians have largely stalled on the subject. "The Obama administration keeps talking about how they're going to get tougher on China," Waddell says. "And the Republicans said they're going to get tough on China too. But we'll see of push comes to shove if any are actually willing to get tough on China." The other major problem is a **shortage of talent** for American manufacturers. Plants have become more technologically advanced, and necessitate some vocational school training. Waddell points out that it's becoming more and more difficult to find a pool of workers that are qualified to work around machines—and interested in doing it. It's a point echoed by the The Alliance for American Manufacturing, a non-profit that lobbies for American manufacturing. "We need an educational system that does not **warehouse** kids who want vocational careers," writes executive director Scott Paul. "We need our business schools to teach managers how to "reshore" work rather than follow the race to the bottom."

### Solvency

#### Global PR campaign shutting down nuclear power now – causing transition to renewables – stopping extinction from meltdowns

Wasserman 12

(Harvery, American journalist, author, democracy activist, and advocate for renewable energy. He has been a strategist and organizer in the anti-nuclear movement in the United States for over 30 years., 'SOLARTOPIA! Our Green-Powered Earth' http://www.huffingtonpost.com/harvey-wasserman/post\_3127\_b\_1353253.html)

In the wake of Fukushima, grassroots citizen action is shutting the worldwide nuclear power industry. A Solartopian tipping point is upon us in the U.S., Europe and Japan which will re-define how the human race gets its energy. States rights and local democracy are at the core of the battle. The definitive breaking point looms in Vermont. By mid-March a state board is likely to deny the Yankee reactor licenses to operate or to create radioactive waste. If that happens, a Vermont shutdown could mark a critical moment in establishing state power over an atomic reactor. A critical domino would fall -- as it has in Japan and Europe -- and we will begin taking down old reactors all across the U.S. Four new reactors barely under construction will go down with them, making inevitable the end America's age of atomic power. In Vermont, the New Orleans-based Entergy bought the Yankee reactor in 2002. Entergy agreed to shut it if the state's Public Service Board denied it a Certificate of Public Good to continue to operate and generate radioactive waste. That decision is due by March 21, the forty-year anniversary of the reactor's 1972 opening. Entergy has horrified many of its staunchest Green Mountain supporters. One of its cooling towers has simply collapsed from ancient rot and basic negligence. It has leaked tritium and other radioactive isotopes from pipes the company has said -- under oath -- do not exist. Entergy sued Vermont after the legislature voted (26 to 4) to shut the reactor. When its lawyers won in federal court, Entergy demanded the public pay it $4 million in legal fees. But the company miscalculated. It welcomed Federal Judge Garvan Murtha's ruling that the legislature could not shut Yankee (the state is appealing). But Murtha also upheld the right of the Public Service Board to deny Entergy those operating and waste production permits. So after lauding the decision, Entergy's lawyers now want Murtha to change it. Entergy has also asked the Public Service Board for a stay in its expected denial of the permits. The case is clearly headed to the corporate-owned U.S. Supreme Court. But for Entergy to win, the Roberts majority would have to rule that the company was temporarily insane when signed its agreements with the state, and that a state agency can be forced (against its will) to issue reactor operating and waste creating permits. The history of U.S. courts denying states the right to shut reactors dates back to the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. But deferral to the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission's bent for keeping rush-bucket reactors on line is rapidly eroding. The Commission granted Vermont Yankee a license extension one day before the Fukushima disaster. A state-mandated shut down could seriously impact the political calculus for an industry whose grassroots opposition has become a full-on tsunami. New York's Indian Point reactors are under assault from Governor Andrew Cuomo, whose father cut the 1988 deal that forced Long Island's Shoreham reactor to shut without ever achieving commercial operation. Cuomo is being pushed by a fierce grassroots anti-nuke groundswell. Entergy does need state permits that would let two remaining reactors at Indian Point (Unit One went down long ago) continue heating and irradiating the Hudson River. New York could demand Entergy build extremely expensive cooling towers,which may force it to shut down for economic reasons. Similar forces are at work in New Jersey and other states. In Florida, botched multi-billion dollar repairs to the Crystal River reactor near Tampa have forced a brutal grassroots battle over soaring electric rates which must be approved by increasingly beleaguered state regulators. It is highly likely that reactor will never operate again. At Pilgrim, Mass., is strongly intervening against a license extension. Both remaining reactors are currently shut at California's San Onofre (Unit One there also went down long ago), where grassroots activists -- including local surfers -- are in pitched battle against re-opening. Ohio's Davis-Besse is having its containment dome sliced for the fourth time. Two reactors in Nebraska are still recovering from major flooding. All across the country, dozens of rust-bucket nukes stagger on their last legs even as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission hands them extended licenses in the face of escalating state and local opposition. Once the firewall against recourse from the states is breached, a flood of shutdowns could well follow. In Japan, utilities must have permits from a host prefecture to re-open after refueling or repairs. Of 54 licensed reactors nationwide, only two now operate. Both could be shut soon, rendering Japan nuke-free for the first time in four decades. Germany has shut eight reactors and will take down 11 more by 2012. Except for Great Britain and a number of eastern holdouts, the "nuclear renaissance" has been all but abandoned in Europe, with an escalating cascade of elderly nukes going cold and proposed new projects being abandoned. The accelerating revolution in renewables has allowed solar, wind and other green sources to outstrip atomic reactors in cost, time to build, ecological impact and safety. As billions pour into Solartopian sources, private investment in atomic energy has all but disappeared -- except where there are massive taxpayer subsidies. Even that's not enough. In 2011, President Obama handed $8.33 billion in federal loan guarantees to the builders of two reactors at Georgia's Vogtle. But Peach State ratepayers are already being soaked for billions more in pre-payments, and the cost of the project is soaring. A parallel financial disaster looms at the Robinson site in neighboring South Carolina. Though the industry assumes these four reactors will eventually be finished, economic realities may say otherwise. Cost estimates for new nukes have been soaring even before construction begins. Even with federal money, the builders still demand that state ratepayers foot the bill as the process proceeds, meaning consumers are on the hook for multiple billions even if the reactors never open. Pitched battles over this Construction Work in Progress scam have already been won by consumers in Missouri and are being fought in Iowa and elsewhere. As the years of building drag on, costs will escalate while renewables continue to become cheaper. Sooner or later, construction is likely to stop, as it did at numerous projects in the 1970s and 1980s which were never finished. Today the Department of Energy still sits on some $10 billion in available guarantees without a recipient ready to build a new nuke. For the first time since early in the George W. Bush years, there has been no executive request for additional reactor construction loan guarantees. In Finland and Flamanville, France, new reactor projects are years behind schedule and billions over budget. With new construction virtually abandoned, and the continued operation of old reactors under intense attack in Japan, Europe and the U.S., only China and India remain as likely sites for large numbers of new nukes. Russia is doing its best to peddle them throughout the Third World. South Korea wants to sell reactors to the United Arab Emirates. But grassroots resistance in India has been fierce. China is still mulling a post-Fukushima decision on whether to proceed with reactors already under construction. Signs of a popular uprising against rampant pollution -- including nuclear reactors -- indicate growing public opposition. But here in the U.S., we are at the fall-off-the-cliff moment for atomic energy, new and old. Entergy, says Deb Katz of the Citizens Awareness Network, has been "blinded by its arrogance and contempt for the state of Vermont." The company, she says, "is attempting to establish that corporations are more powerful than the states they operate in." If the citizens of Vermont can shut Yankee, a dam will be breached and the post-Fukushima power of a rising grassroots tsunami will be made tangible. Solartopia will be that much closer. And the grassroots No Nukes campaign will begin to take its place as one of history's most successful popular movements. Let's just make sure these shut-downs happen before the next Fukushima irradiates us all.

#### PPA fails

Jeffrey Marqusee 12, Executive Director of the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) and the Environmental Security Technology Certification Program (ESTCP) at the Department of Defense, March 2012, “Military Installations and Energy Technology Innovation,” in Energy Innovation at the Department of Defense: Assessing the Opportunities, http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Energy%20Innovation%20at%20DoD.pdf

There is an extensive literature on the impediments to commercialization of these emerging energy technologies for the building infrastructure market. 82 A key impediment (and one found not just in the building market) is that energy is a cost of doing business, and thus rarely the prime mission of the enterprise or a priority for decision makers. In contrast to sectors such as information technology and biotechnology, where advanced technologies often provide the end customer with a new capability or the ability to create a new business, improvements in energy technology typically just lower the cost of an **already** relatively **low-cost commodity (electricity).** As a result, the market for new technology is highly price sensitive, and life-cycle costs are sensitive to the operational efficiency of the technology, to issues of maintenance, and to the estimated lifetime of the component. Thus, a first user of a new energy technology bears significantly more risk while getting the same return as subsequent users. A second impediment is the slow pace of technological change in the U.S. building sector: it takes years, if not decades, for new products to achieve widespread use. One reason for this is that many firms in the industry are small; they lack the manpower to do research on new products, and they have limited ability to absorb the financial risks that innovation entails. A third impediment to the widespread deployment of new technologies arises from the fragmented or distributed nature of the market; decisions are usually made at the individual building level, based on the perceived return on investment for a specific project. The structural nature of decision making and ownership can be a significant obstacle to technological innovation in the commercial market: n The entity that bears the up-front capital costs is often not the same as the one that reaps the operation and management savings (this is known as the “split incentives” or “principal agent” problem). n Key decision makers (e.g., architecture and engineering firms) face the **liabilities** associated with operational failure but **do not share in the potential savings,** creating an incentive to prefer reliability over innovation. n Financing mechanisms for both energy efficiency (by energy service companies using an ESPC) and distributed and renewable energy generation (through PPA and the associated financing entities) require high confidence in the long-term (decade-plus) performance of the technology, and thus investors are unwilling to put capital at risk on new technologies. Other significant barriers to innovation include a lack of information, which results in high transactional costs, and an inability to properly project future savings. As the National Academy of Sciences has pointed out, the lack of “evidence-based” data inhibits making an appropriate business case for deployment. 83 The return on the capital investment is often in terms of avoided future costs. Given the limited visibility of those costs when design decisions are being made, it is often hard to properly account for them or see the return. This is further exacerbated by real and perceived discount rates that can lead to suboptimal investment decisions. Finally, the lack of significant operational testing until products are deployed severely limits the rapid and complete development of new energy technologies. The impact of real-world conditions such as building operations, variable loads, human interactions, and so forth makes it very difficult to optimize technologies, and specifically inhibits any radical departure from standard practice. These barriers are particularly problematic for new energy efficiency technologies in the building retrofit market, which is where DoD has the greatest interest. In addition to these barriers, which are common across DoD and the commercial market, DoD has some unique operational requirements (security and information assurance issues) that create other barriers.

#### Rapid nuke power production moves the US away from oil – lowers prices

ROBERTSON ‘11 - Villanova University, Adjunct Professor; founder and editor-in-chief of Casavaria (“Nuclear Power & Offshore Drilling May Keep Oil Prices Artificially High”. October 20, 2011. http://www.casavaria.com/hotspring/2011/10/20/1474/nuclear-power-offshore-drilling-may-keep-oil-prices-artificially-high/)

Now, given the **intense** security **concerns related to nuclear power**, **rapid construction is** literally **impossible**. Federal public health and environmental laws also require fastidious attention to detail, which has intensified since the last plant was constructed 3 decades ago. Failure to meet with absolute precision all the security requirements can result in catastrophic accidents and/or major cost-overruns in relation to federal regulatory fines and/or takeovers. This means that entirely new systems for construction need to be designed and tested before even the first construction of any new plant can begin. There is, simply put, no way that new nuclear plants can affect current gas prices. **The timeline** here **has** also **been pushed back as far as 2030 for any significant shift on** percentage of national energy **production** derived **from nuclear power**, if the massive new construction project were undertaken. With both offshore drilling and new nuclear construction likely to delay the infusion of new supply into the domestic energy economy, the real economic result of committing to these strategies for expanding domestic energy production may actually be the increase in prices for oil and automotive gasoline, as it **becomes clear** that overall **supply depends heavily on these resources** for the foreseeable future. Over the last few years, as carbon pricing legislation has stalled, discussion about future economic development has shifted to the need for funding the broad expansion of national infrastructure for renewable resources, like wind and solar power.

#### Decreasing prices crushes the alternative energy transition and causes climate change

HUAG ’11 - Former Director at the International Energy Agency; educated at Harvard; chairs the Advisory Group on Energy of the EC and is Senior Research Advisor at the Oxford Institute of Energy Studies (Huag, Marianne. “Clean energy and international oil”. November 1, 2011. http://oxrep.oxfordjournals.org/content/27/1/92.abstract)

Developing and commercializing clean energy is one of the basic strategies to combat climate change. It involves the near total decarbonization of the power sector, the use of renewables and low-carbon fuels for heating and cooling, and last, but not least, the increasing substitution of oil in the transport sector. Hybrid, battery electric, and fuel-cell cars fuelled by clean power or hydrogen, together with sustainable biofuels and natural gas/CNG, are considered the most likely technologies that will reduce oil demand Such fundamental transformation of the energy sector evolves over time through coevolution of technologies, markets, institutions, and societal values. Despite the absence of a global price or tax for carbon, governments of the major economies worldwide are putting in place the building blocks for a transition to a low-carbon economy. The present emphasis is on support for RD&D and market diffusion for a wide range of technologies in different stages of technological maturity and provision of associated infrastructure. Policies, institutional support, industrial capacities, and renewable resource base vary widely among countries. We know that 10–20 years are needed to introduce the diversity of technologies and policy approaches that should be helpful during this formative stage of the transition to address different public concerns in different countries and search for best solutions in both a country-speciﬁc and a global context. Which energy mix of clean energy will evolve is highly uncertain. However, the broad based RD&D and infrastructure investments and commercial scaling up of clean technologies should narrow choices and reduce costs of substitutes for oil within the next 10–15 years and choices for new low-carbon vehicles in 20 years. In this evolving process of technology selections and industrial and policy engagement, the role of emerging economies as major investors in clean technology and cost-competitive producers will become crucial. What are the chances that the transformative dynamic towards clean energy is derailed again? A span of 10–20 years is a long time to introduce competitive choices for clean electricity, sustainable biofuels, clean hydrogen, alternative power trains, and the necessary infrastructure. Unforeseen and unforeseeable events will happen over such an extensive time span. Chernobyl changed the growth of nuclear power, decisively, Fukushima is jolting the nuclear renaissance, and a meteorite hit may invalidate the climate change threat for a century or more. However, the probability that a clean energy transition will unfold is very high. First, RD&D and niche market support has unleashed a wave of scientiﬁc interest and technological creativity to explore clean-fuel and end-use alternatives in all scientiﬁcally advanced countries. The assumption that competitive backstop technologies for oil will be ready to be scaled up within the 10–20-year period is not only plausible but very likely. Second, the institutional and policy support in favour of clean energy, while highly fragmented and imperfect, is creating vibrant industries with increasing competitive pressure for all technologies, and sustainability as an overarching core value. In brief, the trend to slowing oil demand growth appears irreversible in the absence of a ‘black swan event’. Can international oil inﬂuence the trend through price or quantity strategies, now, before the decline is imminent? **Experience** **shows** that, indeed, consistently **cheap oil will slow** both substitution and the development of alternatives. Theoretically, the world’s low-cost oil producers have the capacity to increase output and ﬂood the market for an extended period of time at low prices, as Sinn with his Green Paradox postulates. Such a major oil price drop could be passed on to the consumers. But governments and societies committed to clean energy could also take such an opportunity to internalize the cost of carbon and energy security, keep consumer petroleum product prices relatively stable, and incentivize the clean energy transition without large ﬁscal outlays. Low-cost producers would gain market share, but would not slow the substitution process. As a corollary, a quantitative strategy to limit crude oil output is likely to increase the expectation of scarcity and oil prices. Renewed oil price hikes would strengthen the commitment of governments to develop alternatives to oil and consumers’ willingness to pay for alternatives and help accelerate market readiness and market opportunities of backstop technologies for oil.

#### Warming is anthropogenic and causes extinction

DEIBEL ‘7 - Professor of IR at National War College, Foreign Affairs Strategy (Terry L. Deibel, “Conclusion: American Foreign Affairs Strategy Today Anthropogenic – caused by CO2”)

Finally, there is one major existential threat to American security (as well as prosperity) of a nonviolent nature, which, though far in the future, demands urgent action. It is the threat of global warming to the stability of the climate upon which all earthly life depends. Scientists worldwide have been observing the gathering of this threat for three decades now, **and what was once a mere possibility has passed** through probability **to near certainty.** Indeed **not one of more than 900 articles** **on climate change published in refereed scientific journals** from 1993 to 2003 doubted that anthropogenic warming is occurring. “In legitimate scientific circles,” writes Elizabeth Kolbert, “it is virtually **impossible to find evidence of disagreement** over the fundamentals of global warming.” Evidence from a vast international scientific monitoring effort accumulates almost weekly, as this sample of newspaper reports shows: an international panel predicts “brutal droughts, floods and violent storms across the planet over the next century”; climate change could “literally alter ocean currents, wipe away huge portions of Alpine Snowcaps and aid the spread of cholera and malaria”; “glaciers in the Antarctic and in Greenland are melting much faster than expected, and…worldwide, plants are blooming several days earlier than a decade ago”; “rising sea temperatures have been accompanied by a significant global increase in the most destructive hurricanes”; “NASA scientists have concluded from direct temperature measurements that 2005 was the hottest year on record, with 1998 a close second”; “Earth’s warming climate is estimated to contribute to more than 150,000 deaths and 5 million illnesses each year” as disease spreads; “widespread bleaching from Texas to Trinidad…killed broad swaths of corals” due to a 2-degree rise in sea temperatures. “The world is slowly disintegrating,” concluded Inuit hunter Noah Metuq, who lives 30 miles from the Arctic Circle. “They call it climate change…but we just call it breaking up.” From the founding of the first cities some 6,000 years ago until the beginning of the industrial revolution, carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere remained relatively constant at about 280 parts per million (ppm). At present they are accelerating toward 400 ppm, and by 2050 they will reach 500 ppm, about double pre-industrial levels. Unfortunately, atmospheric CO2 lasts about a century, so there is no way immediately to reduce levels, only to slow their increase, we are thus in for significant global warming; the only debate is how much and how serous the effects will be. As the newspaper stories quoted above show, we are already experiencing the effects of 1-2 degree warming in more violent storms, spread of disease, mass die offs of plants and animals, species extinction, and threatened inundation of low-lying countries like the Pacific nation of Kiribati and the Netherlands at a warming of 5 degrees or less the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets could disintegrate, leading to a sea level of rise of 20 feet that would cover North Carolina’s outer banks, swamp the southern third of Florida, and inundate Manhattan up to the middle of Greenwich Village. Another catastrophic effect would be the collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation that keeps the winter weather in Europe far warmer than its latitude would otherwise allow. Economist William Cline once estimated the damage to the United States alone from moderate levels of warming at 1-6 percent of GDP annually; severe warming could cost 13-26 percent of GDP. But the most frightening scenario is runaway greenhouse warming, based on positive feedback from the buildup of water vapor in the atmosphere that is both caused by and causes hotter surface temperatures. Past ice age transitions, associated with only 5-10 degree changes in average global temperatures, took place in just decades, even though no one was then pouring ever-increasing amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Faced with this specter, the best one can conclude is that “humankind’s continuing enhancement of the natural greenhouse effect is akin to playing Russian roulette with the earth’s climate and humanity’s life support system. At worst, says physics professor Marty Hoffert of New York University, “we’re just going to burn everything up; we’re going to het the atmosphere to the temperature it was in the Cretaceous when there were crocodiles at the poles, and then everything will collapse.” During the Cold War, astronomer Carl Sagan popularized a theory of nuclear winter to describe how a thermonuclear war between the Untied States and the Soviet Union would not only destroy both countries but possible end life on this planet. **Global warming is the post-Cold War era’s equivalent of nuclear winter at least as serious and considerably better supported scientifically**. Over the long run it puts dangers form terrorism and traditional military challenges to **shame**. It is a threat not only to the security and prosperity to the United States, but potentially to the continued existence of life on this planet.

#### The NRC is not distributing SMR licenses – zero solvency

Tucker 11 (William, energy writer for the American Spectator, "America’s Last Nuclear Hope," March 2011, http://0101.nccdn.net/1\_5/28c/010/2c9/America-s-Last-Nuclear-Hope-Tucker-TAS.pdf-http://0101.nccdn.net/1\_5/28c/010/2c9/America-s-Last-Nuclear-Hope-Tucker-TAS.pdf)

So why isn't there more coordination between the civilian and military efforts? In fact there is some. The first commercial reactor built at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, in 1957 was actually a submarine reactor "beached" by Admiral Rickover's Navy. Since then hundreds of nuclear technicians trained in the Navy have gone on to find jobs in the nuclear industry. One reason most new reactors are now being planned in the South is the large presence of Navy veterans. But beyond that, the Navy's long experience with nuclear does not seem to build anyone's confidence that the technology can be handled in the civilian field. Instead, the great impediment to all this is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the gargantuan Washington bureaucracy that regularly wins awards as the "best place to work in the federal government" yet seems unable to deliver on its main purpose, which is to issue licenses for nuclear reactors. The NRC last issued a license for a nuclear reactor in 1976. No one knows if it will ever issue one again. One utility, Southern Electric, has received permission to begin site clearance at the Vogtle plants 3 and 4 in Georgia. But the Vogtle plants will be Westinghouse AP1000s, a model for which the NRC has not yet issued design approval, let alone permission to build particular projects. Four AP1000s are already well under construction in China, with the first scheduled to begin operation in 2013. Yet here the NRC is still trying to figure out how to protect the reactor from airplanes. Even though the containment structure is strong enough to withstand a direct hit from a commercial jet, the NRC asked Westinghouse to put up a concrete shield to protect adjacent buildings. Then after Westinghouse had completed the revision, the NRC decided the shield might fall down in an earthquake. Further revisions are still pending. When Hyperion first approached the NRC about design approval for its small modular reactor in 2006, the NRC essentially told it to go away -- it didn't have time for such small potatoes. Since then the NRC has relented and sat down for discussions with Hyperion last fall. Whether the approval process can be accelerated is still up for grabs, but at least there has been a response from the bureaucracy. OR COURSE, the NRC is only responding to the lamentations and lawsuits from environmentalists and nuclear opponents who have never reconciled themselves to the technology, even though nuclear's carbon-free electricity is the only reliable source of power that promises to reduce carbon emissions. If a new reactor project does ever make it out of the NRC, it will be contested in court for years, with environmental groups challenging the dotting of every i and crossing of every t in the decision-making. It will be a miracle if any proposal ever makes it through the process.

#### And they need to establish a new regulatory pathway- that’s extra topical- or no solvency- their author

Spencer and Loris ’11 (Jack Spencer is Research Fellow in Nuclear Energy in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, and Nicolas D. Loris is a Research Associate in the Roe Institute, “A Big Future for Small Nuclear Reactors?”, February 2, 2011, LEQ)

• Establish a new licensing pathway. The current licensing pathway relies on reactor customers to drive the regulatory process. But absent an efficient and predictable regulatory pathway, few customers will pursue these reactor technologies. The problem is that the legal, regulatory, and policy apparatus is built to support large light water reactors, effectively discriminating against other technologies. Establishing an alternative licensing pathway that takes the unique attributes of small reactors into consideration could help build the necessary regulatory support on which commercialization ultimately depends.14 • Resolve staffing, security, construction criteria, and fee-structure issues by December 31, 2011. The similarity of U.S. reactors has meant that the NRC could establish a common fee structure and many general regulatory guidelines for areas, such as staffing levels, security require- ments, and construction criteria. But these regulations are inappropriate for many SMR designs that often have smaller staff requirements, unique control room specifications, diverse security requirements, and that employ off-site construction techniques. Subjecting SMRs to regulations built for large light water reactors would add cost and result in less effective regulation. The NRC has acknowledged the need for this to be resolved and has committed to doing so, including developing the budget require- ments to achieve it. It has not committed to a specific timeline.15 Congress should demand that these issues be resolved by the end of 2011.

# 2NC

## CP

### 1NC – Counter-Plan

#### Accelerating SMR development will cause devastating accidents

**Wang 12**  
Ucilia, Forbes, 1-20, “Feds To Finance Small Nuclear Reactor Designs,” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/uciliawang/2012/01/20/feds-to-finance-small-nuclear-reactor-designs/>

Just because small nuclear reactors promise many economic and environmental benefits (they don’t produce dirty air like coal or natural gas power plants do) doesn’t mean they can be developed and made more quickly or cheaply, however. Technology companies also will have to prove that their small nuclear reactors can be just as safe if not safer than the conventional, large-scale nuclear reactors today. The Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster in Japan has shown that a **misstep in designing and operating** a nuclear plant can have a far greater and more **devastating impact** than a mistake in running other types of power plants. That means nuclear power companies — and the government — **will have to do a lot more** to prove that nuclear power should remain an important part of the country’s energy mix.

#### Accidents turn case – kills SMR industry

Reynolds ‘10 - Mechanical Engineering Professor WSU Tri-Cities (Roger S., "APPLICABILITY OF THE NRC LIGHT WATER REACTOR LICENSING PROCESS TO SMRs," July 2010, https://smr.inl.gov/Document.ashx?path=DOCS%2fReading+Room%2fPolicy+and+regulation%2fANS+SMR+APPLICABILITY+OF+THE+NRC+LWR+LICENSING+PROCESS+910.pdf)

Small and Medium Sized Reactors (SMRs) of a Light Water design differ in important ways from each other and from the current fleet of operating reactors. These designs **incorporate innovative approaches** to achieve simplicity, improved operational performance, and enhanced safety. Gas-cooled and liquid metal–cooled reactors represent an even greater departure from current designs and consequently greater challenges to the application of current regulatory guidance. Several of the most challenging issues have been identified and analyzed in recent years. The next section of this paper will discuss this history in some detail. If SMR licensing is to succeed, these issues must be resolved to the satisfaction of the NRC and the public.

### 2NC – Solvency – DARPA – Commercialization

#### **DARPA demonstrations spark commercialization – operates at the frontend of the innovation process**

Sarewitz and Thernstrom 12 (Daniel and Samuel - Consortium for Science, Policy, and Outcomes at Arizona State University, "ENERGY INNOVATION AT THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: ASSESSING THE OPPORTUNITIES,")

Role as First Adopter/Initial-Market Creator In addition to ties to **demonstration capabilities**, DARPA has undertaken a **technology** insertion or **adoption role**. In coordination with other parts of DoD, it has been able to create **initial** or first **markets** for its **new technologies**. Ties to Leadership DARPA has been particularly **effective** when it is tied to senior leaders who can effectuate its technologies through DoD or elsewhere. Because DARPA operates at the **front end of the innovation process**, it historically has required ties to senior DoD leaders to align with the follow-on back end of the innovation system.

### 2NC – Solvency – DOD Test Bed – Barriers/Commercialization

#### Test-bed projects solve – overcomes barriers and creates momentum for SMR development for the military

Matt Stepp et al. 11, specialist in clean energy innovation at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, formerly Fellow at the Breakthrough Institute, et al, May 2011, “Ten Principles for Creating a New U.S. Clean Energy Policy,” http://www.itif.org/files/2011-guiding-principles.pdf

Clean energy innovation includes bridging technologies across the “valleys of death.” The first valley of death – the phase in development between R&D and prototyping the first generation of a technology – is crucially important because it takes the innovation out of the lab and proves its commercial viability. But building the first prototype of a radically new solar installation or demonstrating a new small modular nuclear reactor is **capital intensive and risky**. Because of this, the private sector has historically provided little support for this stage of development and would rather wait until new technologies yield a higher rate of return. So the federal government has played a **significant role** in developing many of the last century’s breakthrough technologies through demonstration and test-bed projects. Past breakthrough technologies like the Internet, nuclear power plants, and jet engines were initially built and tested at federal labs and through private sector collaborations with the military. Currently, the United States is just beginning to implement strategies for bridging technologies from the lab to demonstration, such as through the agreement between ARPA-E and the **Department of Defense to test** advanced **energy technologies suitable for the militaries needs**. But these policies are not permanent, as they are enforced at the agency level without a national strategy or Congressional mandate.

### 2NC – Free Market – SMR Links

#### More warrants- picks winners and losers

Spencer ’11 (Jack Spencer is Research Fellow in Nuclear Energy in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy, Studies at The Heritage Foundation, “Congress’s Recent Attempts to Promote Small Modular Nuclear Reactors Fall Short”, <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/wm3283.pdf>, June 8, 2011, LEQ)

This is the wrong approach because: • It consolidates too much power in Washington. The legislation creates public–private partnerships to “develop” standard designs and “demonstrate” SMR licensing, but private companies already design SMRs. There is no need for the federal government to intervene. Moreover, the licensing process should occur between the design owner and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). There is no role for the DOE. • Lack of clarity risks socializing the SMR industry. The legislation uses taxpayer money to pay for up to 50 percent of SMR design development and 25 percent of the licensing costs. Critically, it does not stipulate who will own the part of the designs that taxpayers have funded. So in essence, the legislation creates a situation where the federal government designs reactors and has an ownership stake in them. • It is anti-competitive. Multiple companies have invested private dollars and resources to build the commercial SMR business. By choosing winners and losers, the DOE would take away the incentive to compete and replace it with the incentive to lobby Washington. The result would be that Washington, not the market, would decide which technologies move forward.

### AT: Perm – Do the CP

#### Severs Plural – CP builds one reactor – plan acquires more – the CP is plan minus

Meridith.edu No date ("Plural and Possessive," http://www.meredith.edu/grammar/plural.htm)

The plural form of a noun indicates simply that there are more than one of the person or thing in question. For most nouns, the plural form includes the letter "s" at the end of the word:

## MANUFACTURING

## CHINA EXPORT

## Solvency

### 2nc NRC

#### And they need to establish a new regulatory pathway- that’s extra topical- or no solvency- their author

Spencer and Loris ’11 (Jack Spencer is Research Fellow in Nuclear Energy in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, and Nicolas D. Loris is a Research Associate in the Roe Institute, “A Big Future for Small Nuclear Reactors?”, February 2, 2011, LEQ)

• Establish a new licensing pathway. The current licensing pathway relies on reactor customers to drive the regulatory process. But absent an efficient and predictable regulatory pathway, few customers will pursue these reactor technologies. The problem is that the legal, regulatory, and policy apparatus is built to support large light water reactors, effectively discriminating against other technologies. Establishing an alternative licensing pathway that takes the unique attributes of small reactors into consideration could help build the necessary regulatory support on which commercialization ultimately depends.14 • Resolve staffing, security, construction criteria, and fee-structure issues by December 31, 2011. The similarity of U.S. reactors has meant that the NRC could establish a common fee structure and many general regulatory guidelines for areas, such as staffing levels, security require- ments, and construction criteria. But these regulations are inappropriate for many SMR designs that often have smaller staff requirements, unique control room specifications, diverse security requirements, and that employ off-site construction techniques. Subjecting SMRs to regulations built for large light water reactors would add cost and result in less effective regulation. The NRC has acknowledged the need for this to be resolved and has committed to doing so, including developing the budget require- ments to achieve it. It has not committed to a specific timeline.15 Congress should demand that these issues be resolved by the end of 2011.

## Oil

### ! OV

Reversibility—It’s the only impact that access human extinction- THEIR WAR SCENARIOS ARE CONTAINED LOCALLY

Hunter 3 (Founder of Greenpeace, Thermageddon, pp. 58-59)

Even though, from the beginning, Rachel Carson had warned of worldwide chemical fallout patterns, the individuals who were most sensitive to her message believed (some still do) it must be possible to find a haven or refuge outside The System, somewhere beyond the reach of the thrashing tails of the dying urban dinosaurs. The back-to-the-land movement, with its flurry of communes being set up as close to the end of the road as possible, in remote valleys or on the shores of isolated bays, was a reenactment of the North American pioneer stage, embodying the same spirit of independence and naive faith in Utopia. A fantasy existed that even a nuclear war was survivable if you lived far enough away from any big cities and you had a supply of seeds, some solar panels, iodine pills, a gun, and a copy of The Whole Earth Catalogue. And it was true, should the nuclear exchange be limited, that it was just possible there would be survivors out in the bush and the countryside, somewhat unscathed. In the face of a truly drastic climate flip of the ecosystem, unfortunately, there ultimately will be no safe, remote places left anywhere. The Pacific Northwest's coniferous forests are expected to last longer than boreal forests, as rising temperatures turn the glacial moraine into a frying pan, but with climate itself affected, everything - everywhere - is affected. The skies and air and water of even Walden Pond are already degraded and slipping further. If the sudden global heating we have triggered does indeed activate an ice age, there will be no place in the entire northern hemisphere to hide. In the worst-case situation, a runaway greenhouse effect, there would be no place on Earth, period. The fantasy of escaping to an organic farm is no longer a reasonable, let alone viable, option. A better, more realistic hope, by the time my grandson is my age, will be to head out into space. Good luck making the final crew list, Dexter.

**Climate change causes war – 5 reasons.**

Pauchari 07 [R.K., IPCC chairman, December 10, p. 4, http://www.ipcc.ch/]

Peace can be defined as security and the secure access to resources that are essential for living. A disruption in such access could prove disruptive of peace. In this regard, climate change will have several implications, as numerous adverse impacts are expected for some populations in terms of: - access to clean water, - access to sufficient food, - stable health conditions, - ecosystem resources, - security of settlements.

### UQ

#### Oil prices are going into bull market mode ----- Trends prove oil will stabilize, and our links assumes all of their uniqueness: (A) Saudi will stabilize ----– future predictive evidence and empirical examples prove that recent price changes are just matching supply and demand

TOD ’12 \*\*\*Cites Stuart Staniford - UC Davis; Ph.D (The Oil Drum. “Tech Talk - Saudi Arabia and Natural Gas Liquids”. June 10, 2012. http://www.theoildrum.com/node/9243)

The price of crude oil has been shown to have significant impact on the global economy, and in the current and somewhat fragile state of the various parts of that economy, the lower prices help. Yet Stuart Staniford has commented that **given** the **Saudi need** **for income** to hold off “Arab Spring” dissatisfaction, **they are unlikely to let prices fall too far before cutting production**, since even a 10% reduction in output could raise prices 20%, thereby resolving their future income concerns. This reflects well **the role of the Texas** **Railroad** **Commission** back **when it controlled** US production in order to sustain an acceptable price for oil. But that role collapsed when overall US production was no longer able to spring to the rescue when demand rose and US production could not, passing the control over prices to OPEC and more particularly the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), who have shown a willingness to control output to ensure that it proximately followed demand and has kept prices within an acceptable range for them. **Their recent increase in production to offset possible Iranian sanctions**, however, is likely to be transient, since – apart from annoying Iran, **it has also driven prices below that benchmark**.

#### (B) The market is under control ----– we’re just seeing the same patterns from 08

GRAEBER ’12 Senior Journalist; extensively with UPI (Graeber, Daniel. “Will 2012 Play Out Like 2008 for Oil Markets?”. June 26, 2012. http://www.cnbc.com/id/47960423)

In July 2008, oil prices moved close to $150 per barrel. By December of that year, roughly $100 was off the price as the global economy began to sink. Nearly **four years later**, and **not much has changed**. Most political statements are still couched in promises of employment prospects and last week, the Dow Industrials lost two percent of its value. That suggests there's not much in the markets to give investors any sense of optimism. The US economy is sluggish, China's is slowing down and reports of a dismal European economy have resonated to the point of redundancy. Last week, forecasts of Tropical Storm Debby pushed crude oil to higher territory as some international oil companies shut production as a precautionary measure. By Monday, however, those gains had proved short-lived. By mid-day, most markets were sinking quickly on concerns that Spain may be the latest candidate to freeze the European economy. That sent bank stocks spiraling and erased any gains made in oil. Most analysts had said sentiment in the oil market is, at best, dismal. There is seemingly plenty of oil available in the markets, which may in part explain prices. In the U.S., crude oil production is so prolific that the country lacks the infrastructure to do much with it. Globally, the Saudis may even consider **constraining markets in an effort to keep oil prices** under control. Much of the oil glut may be temporary protection against the series of sanctions set to go into force against Iran, however. That suggests there will likely be no major long-term impacts from the shortage of Iranian crude despite a few jitters the first week of July. Investors say hope is long gone from conversations about European recovery. It's hard to say if dismantling the Eurozone would ease some of the restrictions. Recent commentary suggests that's not the case. Domestic protectionism rarely works in an international market either. **OPEC**, in its monthly report for June, **suggested** markets look an awful lot like they did in December 2008. The cartel, however, said it saw some resiliency in the US economy. With retail gasoline prices in the United States moving close to $3 per gallon, some benefits could come as economically depressed Americans take to the road for summer holiday. By the time OPEC pens its next report, U.S. and European sanctions against Iran will be two weeks old. The story of the Great Recession isn't over but it's been a **steady** story **long enough** to suggest that as much as negativity lingers, there's still at least talk of hope.

#### (C) Trends prove ----- prices will rise, but they’re volatile

PLUMER ’12 - Reporter, Washington Times (Plumer, Brad. “ For first time in years, the world is producing more oil than it needs “. June 5, 2012. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/oil-prices-are-collapsing--is-that-a-good-thing/2012/06/05/gJQAYm3zFV\_blog.html)

One caveat, though: It’s still entirely possible that oil prices won’t keep falling. Stuart Staniford notes that Saudi Arabia could decide to cut production in the near future. Remember, most OPEC countries **need** relatively **high** oil **prices to pay for** the domestic **spending** programs they’ve recently put in place **to placate protestors**. And there’s always the possibility of a surprise plot twist. Negotiations with Iran could break down. Or Europe could suddenly fix its problems But that’s just another way of saying that we’ve reached an era in which oil **prices are extremely volatile** — and difficult to predict. Which is why Kevin Drum wonders if the United States would be better off with some sort of variable tax on oil that kept prices at a steady (but fairly high) price. That would allow the country to slowly but steadily reduce its reliance on crude, rather than lurching from panic to complacency and back to panic every time there’s a sudden kink in the world oil markets.

### LINK

HULBERT ’12 - Lead Analyst at European Energy Review; Senior Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute for International Relations; Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Security Studies (Hulbert, Matthew. “OPEC's Pending Bloodbath”. June 10, 2012. http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/06/10/opecs-pending-bloodbath/)

That’s unlikely to happen, precisely because Riyadh can bring further pricing pressures to bear **if it wants to get its way** in the cartel. The Kingdom’s policy space has admittedly tightened over the past couple of years, but they remain **the only producer capable of significantly increasing or reducing production at will**. Initial tanker data from Europe suggests Riyadh may have started reigning in production that was running around 6% over OPEC quota. It’s also raised July benchmarks for Arab Light grades in Asia. But Iran, Venezuela, Nigeria, Angola and Algeria will want restraint to come far faster and far deeper to firm prices. The line being spun from the ‘free lunch’ brigade is that storage should easily cover any Iranian spikes when EU sanctions come into full effect 1st July, while OPEC quotas should be pared down to 29.5mb/d (or less). Cheap words from petro-hawks, not least because they’ll all continue to cheat on quotas to squeeze out every last drop they have. Riyadh knows that of course; hawks want a price floor to be set at $100/b to sustain political regimes, but to do so entirely at Saudi expense. Russia is no different outside the cartel: free riding 101. Saudi Arabia (and its GCC partners) might be willing to play ball given ongoing concerns from the Arab Awakening, but with some budgetary tweaks and counter-cyclical cash to burn, they could all easily survive at $85/b making Iran et al sweat. Tehran might decide to rip up formal quotas as it did in June 2011, but that would be a costly mistake. If the Saudis let prices fall, political outages across smaller producer states could help to set a floor for them anyway. Iran would have no say in the matter. Given such ‘pricing perils’, Saudi Arabia holds all the aces to settle institutional issues, not to mention giving the global economy more breathing space (and Washington greater leeway over Iranian sanctions). But the real reason to let prices fall a little further isn’t just to make very clear to OPEC states where the ultimate volume and pricing power rests, but to fight Riyadh’s **bigger battle** over the next decade: **Retaining** 40% of **OPEC market share in the midst of supposedly huge non-OPEC supply growth**. It didn’t go unnoticed that despite Saudi production averaging 31 year highs and prices hitting $128/b in March 2012, the forward curve for 2018 was trading at $30/b discounts relative to spot. You’d think with the cartel maxed out and proximate demand side problems looking bleak, five year curves would be exactly the other way, in sharp contango (i.e. far above prompt prices) once the global economy and demand side fundamentals were fixed. The fact they weren’t is principally because the market thinks vast swathes of unconventional production will come online, not just in North America where production is back above 6mb/d, but in Canada, Brazil and even Arctic extremes. At $100/b that was a fair bet to place, but once benchmark prices drop back to two figures, the 6.4 trillion barrels of unconventional reserves sitting in the Americas look a far less certain prospect. Canadian tar distinctly sticky; Brazilian pre-salt horribly deep; Russian Arctic plays simply impossible. So when OPEC meets in Vienna expect Saudi Arabia to call the shots. The new Secretary General will either be a Saudi national, or a compromise candidate Riyadh can live with. Quotas will stay close to 30mb/d with minor reductions possible. Thinly veiled threats of sustained (or increased) production will be made if Iran doesn’t play ball. Yet the long term price point to watch isn’t just one that keeps OPEC in business and Riyadh in control, but where the al-Saud can maintain secular market share. Letting prices **informally slide** to $85-90/b **might be the** kind of warning shot **Riyadh wants** to send to scrub unconventional plays off global balance sheets. Its OPEC colleagues will see that as sailing far too close to the political wind, but a Saudi bloodbath now, might be just the medicine

# 1NR K

### Impact Debate

### Overview

**Plans focus on terminal war impacts masks structural violence - causes extinction**

**Pandey in 2k6** (Anupam, thesis submitted to faculty of graduate studies and research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of doctorate of philosophy department of political science Carleton university, Forging bonds with women, nature and the third world: an ecofeminist critique of international relations, pg. 17-18)

Despite the fact that many significant critiques have made their presence felt, **the discipline of IR continues to be dominated by the sub-field of military security. The** chief **reason** for the same **is** the preponderance of **the Realist paradigm which needs to be situated within the circumstances of the historical legacy and birth of IR,** the Cold War, **the emergence of a single hegemon post-Cold War, the renewed threat of terrorism, etc**. Thus, **concepts of balance of power, deterrence, sovereignty, etc. have come to occupy the central and vast majority of space in the subject matter of the discipline**. Both theory and practice have served to reinforce each other and this partnership has served to marginalize all other issues which are regarded as “normative” concerns to the margins of the IR. Thus, **issues such as Third World debt and poverty are relegated to the realm of “low politics” and hence put on the backburner, while matters pertaining to state security, wars, weaponisation and sovereignty are studied as an integral part of the “high politics” which deserve salience.** However, **the more recent innovation of human security studies is relevant to the Third World by sheer dint of its subject matter which explores human vulnerability across the globe that could be the result of natural or man-made disasters**. Simon Dalby states that traditionally there have been two elements to human security — freedom from fear and freedom from want but over the years, the former element has overshadowed the latter (2002: 7). Further, he quotes the UNDP Human Development Report (1994) to define human security. Thus, **issues of poverty, disease, hunger, famines, financial crises feature prominently here under the overarching topics of freedom from want and hunger** (Thomas and Wilkins 2004). In the coming century**, the six great threats to human security are unchecked rise in population, disparities in economic opportunities, excessive international migration, environmental degradation, drug trafficking and international terrorism** (Dalby 2002: 8**). It becomes clear that these threats are the result of actions of millions of people rather than deliberate actions of specific states.** Therefore, **the concept of security must change from the realist, statist and militarist preoccupations to include human welfare**. Despite the fact that the approach is holistic in its understanding of world affairs and emancipatory in terms of its agenda, its drawback lies in that it largely espouses a liberal humanitarian framework rather than a radical departure from existing structural constraints.

**The Aff’s androcentric approach to science creates a self-fulfilling prophecy in which communities of difference cannot survive. It is not that science or technology is bad, rather that patriarchal values have infiltrated these venues as a means to dominate, oppress, exploit and kill. The only logical outcome is ecological and nuclear catastrophe.**

**Nhanenge 7**

(Jytte, Masters @ U South Africa, Accepted Thesis Paper for Development Studies, “ECOFEMINSM: TOWARDS INTEGRATING THE CONCERNS OF WOMEN, POOR PEOPLE AND NATURE INTO DEVELOPMENT, uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/10500/570/1/dissertation.pdf)

The androcentric premises also have political consequences. They protect the ideological basis of exploitative relationships. Militarism, colonialism, racism, sexism, capitalism and other pathological 'isms' of modernity get legitimacy from the assumption that power relations and hierarchy are inevitably a part of human society, due to man's inherent nature. Because when mankind by nature is autonomous, competitive and violent (i.e. masculine) then coercion and hierarchical structures are necessary to manage conflicts and maintain social order. In this way, the cooperative relationships such as those found among some women and tribal cultures, are by a dualised definition unrealistic and utopian. (Birkeland 1995: 59). This means that power relations are generated by universal scientific truths about human nature, rather than by political and social debate. The consequence is that people cannot challenge the basis of the power structure because they believe it is the scientific truth, so it cannot be otherwise. In this way, militarism is justified as being unavoidable, regardless of its patent irrationality. Likewise, if **the scientific "truth**" were that humans would always compete for a greater share of resources, then the rational response to the environmental crisis would seem to be "dog-eat-dog" survivalism. This creates a **self-fulfilling prophecy in which nature** and community simply **cannot survive**. (Birkeland 1995: 59). This type of social and political power structure is kept in place by social policies. It is based on the assumption that if the scientific method is applied to public policy then social planning can be done free from normative values. However, according to Habermas (Reitzes 1993: 40) the scientific method only conceal pre-existing, unreflected social interests and pre-scientific decisions. Consequently, also social scientists apply the scientific characteristics of objectivity, value-freedom, rationality and quantifiability to social life. In this way, they assume they can unveil universal laws about social relations, which will lead to true knowledge. Based on this, correct social policies can be formulated. Thus, social processes are excluded, while scientific objective facts are included. Society is assumed a static entity, where no changes are possible. By promoting a permanent character, social science legitimizes the existing social order, while obscuring the relations of domination and subordination, which is keeping the existing power relations inaccessible to analysis. The frozen order also makes it impossible to develop alternative explanations about social reality. It prevents a historical and political understanding of reality and denies the possibility for social transformation by human agency. The prevailing condition is seen as an unavoidable fact. This implies that human beings are passive and that domination is a natural force, for which no one is responsible. This permits the state freely to implement laws and policies, which are controlling and coercive. These are seen as being correct, because they are based on scientific facts made by scientific experts. One result is that the state, without consulting the public, engages in a pathological pursuit of economic growth. Technology can be used to dominate societies or to enhance them. Thus both science and technology could have developed in a different direction. But due to patriarchal values infiltrated in science the type of technology developed is meant to **dominate, oppress, exploit and kill**. One reason is that patriarchal societies identify masculinity with conquest. Thus **any technical innovation will continue to be a tool for more effective oppression and exploitation**. The highest priority seems to be given to technology that destroys life. Modern societies are dominated by masculine institutions and patriarchal ideologies. Their technologies prevailed in Auschwitz, Dresden, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Vietnam, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and in many other parts of the world. Patriarchal power has brought us acid rain, global warming, military states, poverty and countless cases of suffering. We have seen men whose power has caused them to lose all sense of reality, decency and imagination, and we must fear such power. **The ultimate result of unchecked patriarchy will be ecological catastrophe and nuclear holocaust**.

### PERM

#### Nuclear “experts” invalidate feminist anti-waste knowledge production –eradicating feminist perspectives

Culley and Angelique 2003 - Culley is a PhD Community Psychologist at University of Missouri – Kansas. Angelique PhD Psychologist and Professor of Community Psychology and Social Change at Penn State. *Women’s Gendered Experiences as Long-term Three Mile Island Activists. Gender and Society,* Vol. 17, No. 3 (Jun., 2003), pp. 445-461.

Antinuclear and anti-toxic waste activism is couched in an understanding of technology and science. Women involved in antitoxic activism encounter barriers, particularly the socially constructed and deeply embedded beliefs about women and science that are consistent with feminists' conceptions of the hierarchical nature of the personal/private ("female realm") and the public/political ("male realm") (Ferree 1983; Frye 1983; Gurin 1985; Jaggar 1983; Smith 1987). Science

("rational/masculine") has typically rejected women's "ways of knowing" in antitoxic efforts (e.g., "informal," "experience based," "housewife surveys") as unscientific, unobjective, and irrational (Brown and Ferguson 1995; Krauss 1993a). Gender, it appears, plays a substantial role in undermining women's antinuclear activist efforts. Nonetheless, women involved in antitoxic activism are often prompted to act on threats posed by specific hazardous waste sites to the health, well-being, and survival of their families and communities. The literature suggests that women's activism in these cases is influenced by identification with "traditional" roles such as mother and/or housewife (Ackelsberg 2001; Brown and Ferguson 1995; Cable 1992; Gibbs 1982; Hill 1997; Krauss 1993a, 1993b; Pardo 1990). In this way, gen- der acts as a motivator for antinuclear/anti-toxic waste activism. In local social movements in particular, knowledge of power asymmetries is often a result of women's activism, rather than a priori. The "everyday" and the "particular" (e.g., mothers' recognition that something is wrong, rooted in experiences at home, with children, or neighbors) often contradict "expert" or "official" accounts (Brown and Ferguson 1995; Cable 1992; Gibbs 1982; Hill 1997; Krauss 1993a, 1993b; Pardo 1990). Thus, many women have had to prepare to debate with the "experts" to make their case by gaining knowledge in areas of toxicology, nuclear engineering, biology, and research methods (Brown and Ferguson 1995; Couch and Kroll-Smith 1997). This has changed dramatically the relationship between local residents, the "experts," and the meaning of "expert" knowledge. As such, women's antitoxic activism has led to a redefinition of gender equity issues on both personal and political levels (Cable 1992; Gibbs 1982; Hill 1997; Krauss 1993a, 1993b; Pardo 1990) To briefly summarize, local activists' efforts are focused on issues that are highly personal and that they perceive have negative consequences for themselves and their communities. In antitoxic local activism, threats to one's self and loved ones are considered immediate and potentially deadly. Women sense that something is wrong (e.g., awareness of children's, family members', or neighbors' symptoms/ illness) and "insist on its validity as knowledge" (Brown and Ferguson 1995, 151). According to past research (Krauss 1993b; Pardo 1990), gender acts as both a barrier and a facilitator to activism for women in local antitoxic movements. However, past researchers have not examined the effects of gender on long-term activism. In this study, we explore the extent to which gender is perceived as a barrier and/or facilitator over two decades of activism.

### FW

**Questioning epistemology is key to policy making - Debates about the effectiveness in terms of gender of the existing policies are instrumental in shaping the perception of the problems that political actors and the way WE CONSTRUCT our world views**

**Beland 2009**

Daniel Beland. “Gender, Ideational Analysis, and Social Policy” Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society. Vol 16 Num 4. Pp 558-581. Winter 2

Importantly, under many circumstances, political actors and the general public become aware of socially constructed economic and social problems through changing—and socially constructed— statistical indicators such as unemployment, fertility rates, and poverty rates and “focusing events” like perceived catastrophes or unexpected electoral outcomes that attract widespread media cover- age (Kingdon 1995). Moreover, **in areas where the state has long been active, policy problems are perceived through the lens of exist- ing policy legacies and possible grievances about their functioning and impacts.** In other words, **the problems of the day are frequently seen in the mirror of policy-learning processes through which actors draw lessons from existing policies to assess their effectiveness and potential ways to improve or replace them** (e.g., Bennett and Howlett 1992; Bothfeld 2008; Hall 1993; Heclo 1974; King and Hansen 1999; Rose 2004; Sabatier 1988). **Debates about the effec- tiveness of the existing policies are instrumental in shaping the per- ception of the problems that political actors seek to address through their reform proposals** (Weir 1992, 18). In most of the traditional policy literature, **policy learning is depicted as a rationalistic and technocratic process unrelated to cat- egorical inequalities, power, hierarchy, and political struggles.** Y//et, in recent years, a growing number of scholars have challenged this vision of policy learning to emphasize its social and political con- struction (Be´ land 2006; Fischer 2003; King and Hansen 1999). Most **students of policy learning**—including feminist scholars—**agree that, when existing policies are seen as ineffective for handling major problems, actors may feel the need to revise or even replace such policies** (e.g., Abrar, Lovenduski and Margetts 2000; Bothfeld 2008; Jenson 1986; Mazur 2003; Skocpol 1992). For example, when civil society experts and advocates discover that existing social programs negatively impact fertility rates, they can make a case for policy change (Jenson 1986). Therefore, **policy learning can help trigger policy change and, in the ﬁeld of social policy, learning pro- cesses frequently involve gendered categories.** For instance, the learn- ing processes surrounding the concept of social investment has reﬂected changing gender relations—mothers’ employment, most notably (e.g., Dobrowolsky and Lister 2008; Dobrowolsky and Saint-Martin 2005; Jenson 2004). In short, many learning processes regarding social policy are gendered

#### Interrogating dominant policy frameworks creates space for new ways of approaching energy policy – our role as energy policy researchers should be to interrogating the framing of our policies

**Scrase and Ockwell 10** (J. Ivan - Sussex Energy Group, SPRU (Science and Technology Policy Research), Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, David G - Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, SPRU, Freeman Centre, University of Sussex, “The role of discourse and linguistic framing effects in sustaining high carbon energy policy—An accessible introduction,” Energy Policy: Volume 38, Issue 5, May 2010, Pages 2225–2233)

This paper has provided several examples where central elements of energy policy have been discursively constructed so as to speak directly to core government priorities, such as economic growth and national security. This has served to **maintain the dominance of the current framing of energy policy** and to **promote certain political interests**. This is a challenging observation if one argues that energy policy needs to be **reframed**. The transition to a low carbon economy may be a good idea. Indeed, it is one that is increasingly central in policy discourses in both developed and developing countries. This does not, however, necessarily mean that this discursive shift will have any specific material impact on energy policy. The institutional constraints on discursive developments here still exist and must be **confronted** (or conformed to) **before new policy ideas are likely to gain** any **influence**. Having an impact on the core of energy policy requires **confronting the** dominance, or ‘**discursive hegemony’** of the existing way in which policy is framed – within the context of the constraints that have shaped and **f**acilitated this existing framing. This is almost a ‘Catch-22’ situation if one wants to see urgent action to tackle climate change: to be radical but excluded (and potentially right only with hindsight), or gradualist and engaged in a process that may move too slowly to avert disaster. This argument suggests that reframing energy policy is only likely to be successful if the arguments that support it are discursively constructed in such a way as to speak to core government imperatives. If climate change is one of the central reasons behind needing to reframe energy policy, then the fact that the environment sits outside of the core imperatives that governments have to deliver against to ensure their survival implies that this could be very challenging indeed. It is, of course, possible that future events might transpire to alter this. As mentioned above, catastrophic climate impacts might well mean that protecting the environment becomes a core government imperative. But by this point it may well be too late for any reframing of energy policy to be effective in tackling climate change. Of course there is the possibility in the shorter term that the government imperative to sustain representative legitimacy will put tackling climate on an equal footing with security or economic growth. For this to happen in a relevant timeframe, however, will require extraordinary popular pressure and institutional changes. Ideas serving expansion of fossil fuel markets are strongly embedded in today's predominantly technocratic and nationalistic energy policy discourses. We hope that this article has served to provide an accessible introduction to the ways in which discourse and linguistic framing effects might be playing a role in sustaining **energy policy frameworks** that are **resistant to** the many insightful **changes** often advocated in the pages of Energy Policy. If the influence of such framing effects is accepted, we begin to see how the process of effecting changes in energy policy is not just a technical or economic task, but also a political task. Moreover, this highlights an urgent need for civil society to engage directly with the existing framing of energy policy and the problems it seeks to address in an effort to reframe it around more sustainable, low carbon principles and concerns. The demonstration of the value of a **discourse analytic approach** in this paper, together with other emerging contributions in this field (cited above), also serves to highlight some **important considerations for energy policy researchers**. Moving away from the traditional linear understanding of the policy process **requires researchers to critically reflect** on the interplay of values, beliefs, entrenched interests and institutional structures that serve to **facilitate or constrain the policy traction** of certain framings of **energy policy problems and solutions**. Further than this, it also highlights the **role** in this process that we ourselves play as **researchers**, and the extent to which our own values, beliefs and interests influence the **framing of our research practice and communication**. This has important and far reaching implications, both methodological and normative, raising considerations that are likely to continue to **gain traction** as researchers and policy makers alike increasingly appreciate the need for reflexivity in our approach to **framing**, interpreting and implementing **energy policy** in the decades to come.[2](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421509009471#fn2)